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Summary 
There are many versions of ne bis in idem in EU law. They can be found not 
least in the main sources of human rights of the EU legal order: the general 
principles of EU law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
but also in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and 
many other bodies of law. This essay addresses the notion that there is 
nevertheless a single, ”core” understanding of ne bis in idem that governs 
the development of that norm in all areas of EU law. 
 
This idea has been put forth in recent years against a background of the 
accelerating development of the ”area of freedom, security and justice” and 
of human rights into central components of the supranational legal system of 
the EU. Ne bis in idem is central to the protection of the rights of the 
individual and as such essential to the bid of the EU to provide full 
protection for human rights. In addition, it is central to the structure of the 
modern nation-state in preserving the respect for res judicata and assuring 
the rule of law. In this relation, it also forms an important part of state 
sovereignty. These later circumstances both make the transplantation of 
national versions of ne bis in idem to the supranational level problematic. 
 
At the centre of this essay is the development of ne bis in idem in the 
caselaw of the ECJ after the first of January 2009. That caselaw will be 
interpreted in the light of earlier jurisprudence from the ECJ and the ECtHR 
and the academic discourse on the subject. Focus has been laid on the issues 
addressed in the central empirical material, but an effort has been made also 
to discuss ne bis in idem as a concept and its importance to the extraordinary 
situation that the development of a supranational legal order provides. 
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Sammanfattning 
I EU-rätten finns många versioner av ne bis in idem. De återfinns inte minst 
i huvudkällorna till mänskliga rättigheter i unionen: EU:s allmänna 
principer, stadgan om de mänskliga rättigheterna och Europakonventionen, 
men också i konventionen om tillämpning av Schengenavtalet och många 
andra regelverk. Denna uppsats berör frågan huruvida det ändå finns en 
enda, sammanhållen ”kärn”-förståelse av ne bis in idem som styr dess 
utveckling i alla EU-rättens fält. 
 
Denna idé har förts fram under de senaste åren mot bakgrund av den 
accelererande utvecklingen av ett område med frihet, säkerhet och rättvisa 
och av mänskliga rättigheter till centrala komponenter i EU:s överstatliga 
rättsordning. Ne bis in idem är en centralt till för skyddet av individens 
rättigheter och är därför essentiell för EU:s ambition att erbjuda fullt skydd 
av mänskliga rättigheter. Dessutom fyller ne bis in idem en viktig roll i den 
moderna nationalstaten för att försäkra respekt för res judicata och i 
förlängningen för att upprätthålla nomokratin. Härvid utgör den även en 
central roll i den nationella suveräniteten. Båda dessa senare omständigheter 
gör transplantationen av nationella versioner av ne bis in idem till det 
överstatliga planet problematisk. 
 
Uppsatsen kommer att fokusera på utvecklingen av ne bis in idem i 
rättspraxis från EU-domstolen sedan den första januari 2009. Detta centrala 
material kommer att tolkas utifrån tidigare praxis från EU- domstolen och 
Europadomstolen samt utifrån den akademiska diskursen kring ämnet. 
Diskussionen kommer att koncentreras kring de faktorer som tas upp i det 
centrala materialet, men kommer också att försöka diskutera ne bis in idem 
som koncept och dess bredare roll i den speciella situation som utgörs av 
utvecklingen av en överstatlig rättsordning. 
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Abbreviations 
AFSJ Area of freedom, security and justice 
 
CFI Court of First Instance of the European Union 
 
CISA Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 
 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
EAW  European Arrest Warrant 
 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 
FDEAW  Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant 
 
GC General Court of the European Union 
 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  
 
SIS Schengen Information System 
 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
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1 Introduction  
As the title suggests, this essay has taken as its subject matter the 
development of what is often referred to as the ”principle” of ne bis in idem 
in the caselaw of the ECJ. This first section will introduce the research 
question, its origins, and the method of this essay.  
1.1 Purpose 
This is of course a graduate thesis within the Master of Laws programme at 
Lund University. Thus its aims are to be found in the course syllabus, some 
of the more pertinent points of which will be referred to here, so that they 
may inform the development of the essay. 
 
Among the goals is of course first the aquisition of specialised knowledge of 
a particular field of law by independent research and to present and discuss 
the findings of such an inquiry in a clear, consistent and informed manner. 
Also, the student should show the ability to analyse and make balanced 
assesments of legal issues within the relevant field and to adopt an 
autonomous approach to the legal system. 
 
Essentially, though, another aim is the demonstration of ”knowledge of the 
disciplinary foundation and methods of the field”. In relation to this, the 
observation should be made that discussions of legal method during the 
entirety of my education have been limited to passing remarks about 
”practical legal method” or ”traditional legal dogmatic method”1. 
Paradoxically, this method is simultaneously presented as the real substance 
of the education. At least in Sweden, this paradoxical situation within legal 
education, where legal method is rarely discussed explicitly but rather 
                                                
1 ”Praktisk juridisk metod” eller ”traditionell rättsdogmatisk metod” 
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approached indirectly through study of the sources of law and legal doctrine 
seems to be the norm.2 
 
It might be contended that only practical knowledge is intended by the 
quotation from the syllabus, and that such knowledge is demonstrated by the 
practical performance of legal research, analysis and writing that an essay of 
this sort entails. But the choice has here been made to interpret the criteria 
rather differently, if for no other reason than that it is something that I 
myself want to be better acquainted with before finishing my education. For 
this reason, the discussions of method in this opening part of the essay are 
somewhat longer than what is perhaps the norm, but every effort will be 
made to ensure that they do not overshadow the other aims found in the 
syllabus. 
1.2 Research Question 
This essay began as a review of the caselaw of the ECJ and the ECtHR on 
the principle ne bis in idem since 2009. This subject matter was originally 
suggested to me by my supervisor, Xavier Groussot, and in hindsight it is 
easy to see why he thought it would be a meaningful field of inquiry. 
 
Ne bis in idem, literally ”not twice for the same thing”, is a legal construct 
which, broadly speaking, prevents the duplication of proceedings and/or 
punishment addressing the same offence.3 As such, it is to be found in most 
if not all national legal systems of the world, where it is seen as an 
important guarantee for the protection of individual rights, equity, legal 
certainty and confidence in the judicial system.4 
 
Unfortunately, while the level of abstraction used in the above paragraph is 
as accessible to the reader as it is comfortable for the writer and therefore 
suitable for an introductory section, it is impossible to sustain for long when 
                                                
2 Lehrberg pp. 17-18 
3 Accardo & Louis 2011, p. 99 
4 Stessens & van den Vyngaert 1999, p. 780  
 8 
dealing with the ne bis in idem principle for as simple as it seems when 
wieved from a distance, as complex and manifold does it turn out to be 
when put under closer scrutiny.5  
 
Thus, while it is easy to see that many national legal systems are infused 
with the ne bis in idem principle, different instances of the principle come in 
quite different forms and have quite different purposes. The same is true 
when considering the international versions of the principle, and, most 
important to this essay, the sources of the principle within the legal order of 
the EU. Together with this great variety of versions of the principle, the nigh 
on exceptionless limitation of its scope of application to situations within a 
single jurisdiction form a mosaic pattern of normativity. The most common 
explanation for this latter aspect of the principle is the counteracting interest 
of national sovereignty, most sensitive in the area of criminal law which 
forms the traditional sphere of ne bis in idem.6 
 
Its paradoxical character, important function and conceptual complexity are 
certainly reasons enough to take an interest in ne bis in idem, but there are 
further reasons why ne bis in idem in EU law deserves thorough 
consideration to be found in its historical context, not least the fact that the 
state of European integration hightens the risk of double prosecution, but 
also in that there are suggestions that unprecedented developments in the 
international application of ne bis in idem are taking place within the EU.7 
 
In 2009, the discourse on ne bis in idem in the EU had been intensifying for 
a decade or so. Barring a handful of important judgments from the CJEU 
scattered across the decades since the late sixties, ne bis in idem had been a 
marginalised topic in EU law until the end of the century, when the situation 
changed abruptly. This had to do with the development of the AFSJ and the 
integration by a protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam of the Schengen aquis, 
which contains important provisions on ne bis in idem, into the legal order 
                                                
5 Vervaele 2005, p. 100 
6 de la Cuesta 2002, pp. 710-716 
7 Vervaele 2013b, p. 211 
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of the EU. However, ne bis in idem has also been more frequently discussed 
in cases cases not affected by that rule in the last decade, as the caselaw of 
the ECJ shows. 
 
Several circumstances in that year suggested that a change, perhaps even a 
turn of the tide in the role of the principle on the EU level was on its way. 
First, early in the year, the ECtHR delivered a judgment, Zolotukhin,8 that 
made a strong effort to bring together the quite straggly strands of its earlier 
caselaw on the principle into one authoritative interpretation. The signature 
of the Treaty of Lisbon later that year meant that the EU is now bound to 
accede to the ECHR and will thus in the future be bound by this 
understanding of ne bis in idem. 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights an 
integral part of the EU legal order which meant that a ”new” provision on ne 
bis in idem in Article 50 of that document became binding law. In the 
hierarchy of norms in the Union, the CFR is on the same level as the 
treaties, and the ECJ has declared that it is viewed as the ”principal basis” of 
human rights in the EU.9 
 
Lastly, in that year the first (and as of yet the only) extensive study of the 
caselaw of the ECJ and the ECtHR on ne bis in idem was published, arguing 
in favour of the recognition of a unitary ”core” understanding of the 
principle within the EU legal order, of which the various provisions are but 
”mere attempts” at codification.10 This suggestion, which will form the nave 
of this essay, had earlier been put forth by AG Sharpston in her opinion on 
Gasparini.11 
 
The argument of the AG was that the sui generis nature of the EU legal 
order and the lack of a common approach to ne bis in idem between the 
                                                
8 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, (Appl. No. 14939/03), Judgment of 10 February 2009 
9 de Búrca & Craig 2011, p.362 
10 van Bockel 2009, p. 27 
11 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-467/04 Gasparini and Others, delivered on 15 June 
2006 
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Member States makes it inevitable that the meaning of ne bis in idem in EU 
law should be given by the CJEU. Being a fundamental principle, it should 
have a solid core of which its specific applications (and, one assumes, 
iterations) form part. This core would ultimately fall back on a balancing of 
the values of freedom of movement and security.12 
 
Van Bockel, author of the aforementioned doctoral thesis, supports this idea. 
He proposes that ”ne bis in idem in EU law must be seen as a single and 
indivisible right which applies in the same way in every (punitive) area of 
Community and EU law, whilst fully taking into account the particular 
charactsristics [sic] of each area of law”.13 
 
There is much more to be said about this idea of a ”core understanding” of 
ne bis in idem within the EU legal order, but enough has now been said to 
allow the formulation of the research question of this essay, which will be 
the following: To what degree does the development of the caselaw of the 
ECJ after 2009 support the notion that there is a core understanding of 
what ne bis in idem means in the EU legal order. 
1.3 Method, Material and Limitations 
The empirical section of this essay consists of the central material, that is 
the caselaw of the ECJ after 2009 found in section 5, and of two sections 
supplying background, sections 3 and 4. These sections will introduce the 
areas of law to which ne bis in idem has been of the greatest relevance and 
the content of the main sources of the principle respectively. The three 
empirical sections have all been written using the traditional approach of 
black letter-law. In this regard, some limitations should be noted. First, the 
later caselaw of the ECtHR will not be analysed in any depth. This is mainly 
because of lack of space and time, but also because Zolotukhin provides us 
with a strong, authoritative statement of where the interpretation of ne bis in 
                                                
12 Ibid, paras. 78-84 
13 van Bockel 2009, p. 27 
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idem stands with that court. Also, The caselaw of the ECJ on ne bis in idem 
has two main strands, one deriving from the interpretation of ne bis in idem 
as a general principle in EU law, the other from the Schengen aquis.14 These 
will be in focus in this essay, because they are the most rich in content. 
Other provisions on ne bis in idem will be mentioned and feature to some 
degree in the caselaw analysed, but they will fill a supporting function. The 
caselaw of the CFI/GC will not be included. Section 3 will provide a very 
brief and focused account of two areas of EU law which are of special 
relevance to this essay. 
 
Before accounting for the empirical research, this essay will include a 
section where the concept of ne bis in idem is considered in the abstract in 
order to provide the necessary theoretical foundation for the following 
analysis, section 2. Unfortunately, just as it is generally agreed that ne bis in 
idem does not make part of the international legal order as a rule of custom 
or as a general principle, and just as there are hardly two versions of the 
principle to be found on the national level that have the exact same content, 
so are the different appearances which the principle takes in legal doctrine 
legion. Discussion on the principle in an international context is quite 
common, but the discource has yet to construct any consistent, free-standing 
terminology with which to analyse the various versions of the principle.15 
To be sure some terms, such as the ones used as analytical tools in this 
essay, are reasonably regularly appearing, but their meanings often have 
subtle differences not only on the level of their actual content, but also 
conceptually. 
 
Because this is so, this essay will not accept any one theoretical approach as 
its own, but instead take a more hermeneutic approach, describing not any 
one conception of the principle but its various possible understandings. This 
section will be based on both legal and academic sources discussing ne bis 
in idem. It is not intended to provide a model of what ne bis in idem as such 
                                                
14 Vervaele 2013b, p.227 
15 Indeed, to provide such a model in the context of the EU is one of the aims of van 
Bockel’s thesis. Van Bockel 2009, p. 6 
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is, since it is not the approach of this essay to argue the existance of natural 
law principles. Rather, this conceptual analysis is aimed at providing some 
necessary analytical fundamentals which can be used to further the 
understanding of the empirical material and to clarify some of the possible 
sources of confusion admitted by the concept of ne bis in idem. In addition, 
this section, which will follow the introduction, will serve as a bridge 
between the method and the main body of the essay. The aim of this section 
is to account for the theoretical reasoning underlying this essay rather than 
to put forth an argument in favour of a certain conception of legal reality. 
However, the subject matter of those considerations is ne bis in idem in the 
EU as conceptualised in doctrine and caselaw and thus the section will be of 
a character divided between methodology and empiricism. The reasoning in 
section 2 will be supported by references where possible, however, in parts 
the discussion will be a product of the an accumulated consideration of the 
discource on ne bis in idem and thus have as its basis the sources of this 
essay considered as a whole rather than any specific line of text. 
 
In relation to the conceptual variations in considerations of ne bis in idem, 
this essay cannot give them all equal consideration. Since a rather well-
defined body of caselaw forms the central material of this essay, the aspects 
of ne bis in idem which are dealt with in those cases will of course be in 
focus. However, this does not make the conceptual analysis redundant, since 
it will allow a deeper understanding of those issues and how they relate to 
ne bis in idem as a whole. 
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2 The Concept of Ne Bis in 
Idem 
The proposition that no-one should be punished or prosecuted twice for the 
same cause has a certain common-sense appeal which makes it seem rather 
self-evident.16 Situated within a nexus of values including the protection of 
the rights of the individual, the authority of judgments (and indirectly of the 
judicial system as a whole) and the production of legal certainty it appears, 
at a glance, inextricably linked to the rule of law and to the modern state. 
Indeed, when considering the world map we find that the norm known in 
continental Europe as ne bis in idem is ubiquitous among the liberal-
democratic legal systems of the world.17  
 
However, upon gathering together a collection of specimen of ne bis in idem 
in law and in judicial and academic jurisprudence putting them under the 
microscope it easy to become somewhat dazzled by the seemingly endless 
variation with which one is confronted. What is it that the state cannot do 
twice? And to whom? And why? And when? And where? And what is it 
that must be ”the same” in the two instances? These are all questions to 
which ne bis in idem can be concieved as giving quite different answers. So, 
while ne bis in idem certainly appears to be a key aspect of the modern rule 
of law, as the following discussion will show it does not take the form of a 
monolithic legal principle.18 
 
Of course, these divergent impressions when considering the ne bis in idem 
on different levels of magnification do not mean that the idea of a common 
core to all different versions of ne bis in idem can be discarded without 
further consideration. Nevertheless, this paradoxical nature presents a 
                                                
16 Conway 2003, p. 222 
17 De la Cuesta 2002, pp. 707-708 
18 Vervaele 2005, pp. 100-101 
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problem because while it is often easy to identify two provisions as versions 
of ne bis in idem, it is not easy, even when arguing from a clearly defined 
empirical material to come up with a definition of what ne bis in idem is in 
and of itself. To provide such a definition would of course go far beyond the 
scope of an essay of this kind, but it would also be wrong to proceed to try 
to point out regularities and divergencies in the caselaw of the ECJ on ne bis 
in idem with eyes closed to this problem. Therefore, this section will attempt 
to point out some of the conceptual variations and ambiguities of which ne 
bis in idem is capable before going on to define the central issues which will 
be set at the centre of the concluding analysis. The aim of this approach is to 
make clear the theoretical and contextual tectonics against which the lege 
lata issues can be properly evaluated, and to avoid as far as possible further 
confusion. 
 
2.1 Ne Bis in Idem: Context and Rationale 
First of all it must be noted that while this section concerns the ne bis in 
idem principle in the abstract rather than as resulting from any particular 
source of law, it is the present-day legal principle and nothing else that is 
the subject of this essay. This essay of course does not provide sufficient 
resources to consider in any depth what law is, and that is not what is 
intended by such a classification. Rather, what is meant is that ne bis in 
idem has been concieved and elaborated in the context of modern legal 
systems, and that today its various iterations, at least so far as they are of 
relevance to this essay, all form part of particular legal systems. Despite its 
authoritatively latin name, ne bis in idem is not an arcadian concept, but 
rather has been elaborated in close connection with the development of the 
modern legal system. While referring back to roman legal concepts, it is 
unwise to assume the connection to be direct, as the roman concept was 
probably quite different to the modern one. Thus, it is this ne bis in idem 
principle within modern systems of law, in the context of legal proceedings, 
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of formal and substantive legal norms and of the Rechtsstaat that is at the 
root of this essay.19 
 
To point out that the traditional context of ne bis in idem and its rationale is 
the national legal system is important because the context of ne bis in idem 
is everchanging. Although the context of the modern nation-state has been 
the habitat of ne bis in idem for a long time, it is not inescapable. The sui 
generis nature of the legal order of the EU becomes quite apparent in the 
context of ne bis in idem, and a transposition of the principle to the 
transnational plane will of course be influenced by the tension between the 
two types of legal order. This tension will be in evidence in every section of 
this essay. Thus, while ne bis in idem is inextricably linked to the modern 
national legal order, it here figures in a completely new context in which 
nothing should be taken for granted.20 
 
The new context provided by the EU raises the question not only what ne 
bis in idem will look like in the Union legal order, but also what its function 
should be. Within the national context, ne bis in idem has been understood 
as performing various functions. Perhaps the first role which springs to 
mind in this day and age is the protection of the rights of the individual. 
This concept of course holds a very strong position in modern law. Within 
national jurisdictions, the role in the safeguarding of such individual rights 
carried out by the principle is widely recognised as essential.21 It is 
particularly strongly emphasised in Common Law jurisdictions, which are 
also more accepting of the res judicata of foreign judgments.22 Its inclusion 
in numerous human rights instruments also make evident this role.23 
 
                                                
19 Lööf 2007, pp. 309-310 
20 van Bockel 2009, pp. 2-4 
21 Bernard 2011, pp. 864-865 
22 Stessens & van den Vyngaert , pp. 783-784 
23 Vervaele 2005, pp. 100-102 
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There are many mechanisms by which ne bis in idem can be seen to exercise 
this function. For example, it concentrates the punishing24 experiences of 
the subject of criminal prosecution to a limited period. In addition to actual 
punishment, such experiences include the stress of being subjected to a trial, 
the social stigma, uncertainty in relation to the immediate and distant future 
etc. But there are also other, more abstract risks against which the individual 
can be inoculated by ne bis in idem, for example the increased risk of being 
found guilty though actually innocent,25 and the risk of procedural mistakes 
on the part of the state.26 
 
This ”Human Rights”-facet of ne bis in idem has been a strong force behind 
the modern development of the norm nationally and internationally. 
However, in a comparative perspective this strong emphasis on the role of 
an individual right is a relatively27 new aspect.28 In the civil law tradition, 
discussions on ne bis in idem have separated the dimension of protecting 
individual rights from its role as a guarantee for legal certainty, for the 
authority of judicial decisions and, in extension, of the courts and the legal 
system itself. According to this latter line of thought, ne bis in idem is 
simply a special case of the broader doctrine of res judicata,29 which 
principle, through its role as a guardian of legal certainty and the autorité de 
la chose jugée, is a fundamental component of the rule of law and the 
modern state.30 
2.2 Ne Bis in Idem: General Issues 
Keeping in mind the changing legal context in which ne bis in idem finds 
itself and the values which bear on it, it is time to point to some of the 
factors which allow such variability. The concepts elaborated on in this 
                                                
24 N.B. Punishment here intended in a very broad sense, including the necessarily taxing 
experience of trial itself, of social reactions, etc. 
25 Conway 2003, p. 222 
26 Wils 2003, p. 138 
27 That is, measured in centuries rather than millenia. 
28 Vervaele 2013, p. 213 
29 Conway 2003, p. 217 
30 Trechsel 2005, p. 383 
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section are not motivated by their role in the latest caselaw on ne bis in idem 
in ECJ caselaw, but by the fact that they are necessary aspects of any 
discussion on ne bis in idem which should be understood before proceeding. 
 
We will begin by discussing the division of ne bis in idem into different 
elements. Many considerations in the doctrine set out from the wording of 
the relevant provision, but many also proceed from a more abstract construct 
of ne bis in idem, often in combination with a more literal approach.31 
Perhaps the most common elements addressed in such discussions are bis 
and idem. The most common, idem, generally concerns the identity of 
judicial decisions in terms of its object.32 Bis, literally translated as ”two 
times”, indicates the forbidden repetition that is central to the ne bis in 
idem.33 
 
These concepts will be further discussed below, as they relate to or form 
part of the specific issues addressed by this essay. However, it should be 
noted in this context that the conceptualisation of ne bis in idem is capable 
of many variations that can be confusing. For example, many discussions on 
ne bis in idem also address the scope of the principle. Such constructs work 
by defining a given type of situation, say for example, situations where a 
legal entity and one of its representatives have both been sanctioned for the 
same cause or where the same person has been the subject of both criminal 
and administrative penalties for the same cause and asking: Will ne bis in 
idem apply in situations such as these? They approach the principle 
externally, trying to chart its limits rather than understand its inner logic.34 
 
Pointing to these possibilities of confusion between the elements of ne bis in 
idem is of course rather abstract, and might seem to be the work of the 
                                                
31 See, for example, Vervaele 2005 for an example of the former, van Bockel 2009 and de 
la Cuesta 2002 for examples of a more theoretical approach, and Trechsel 2005 for a 
combination  
32 Lelieur 2013, p. 205 
33 van Bockel 2009, pp. 45-46 
34 For examples of this, see for example van Bockel 2009, pp. 40-45 and Trechsel 2005, pp. 
385-388 
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devil’s advocate. It should also be noted that these purely abstract 
obscurities does not say anything about the consistency of the concept of ne 
bis in idem in EU law. However, there are many important points to doing 
so. First and foremost, it is necessary in order to be aware of these possible 
changes of meaning when proceeding to concider the sources of ne bis in 
idem in EU law. It also serves a purpose in that the very possibility of these 
different meanings suggests definitions of the elements of ne bis in idem do 
not seem to be given by their nature, but rather result from conventions 
within the particular legal discource in which they appear. 
 
The specific construct of ne bis in idem given in a specific legal context is of 
course influenced by the values introduced above which pertain to ne bis in 
idem. There are also two other issues which relate to the shape of ne bis in 
idem on a more general level that shall be introduced here. Both of them can 
be introduced through sharp dichotomies, namely the distinction between 
rules and principles introduced by Dworkin, and a distinction particular to 
ne bis in idem between emphases on punishment and prosecution 
respectively. 
 
Dworkin famously distinguised between rules and principles as distinct 
legal standards. Rules are concieved of as operators of legal deduction that 
produce results in accordance with Aristotelian logic, where everything 
either is or is not. Principles, on the other hand, give legal guidance but to 
not supply definitive answers. Rather they give reasons that point in a 
specific direction and have a character of weight which is quite different 
from the rigidity of rules.35 
 
In the context of ne bis in idem, the Dworkean dimension is closely related 
to the second dichotomy mentioned above, that between punishment and 
prosecution. Ne bis in idem can be concieved of as prohibiting a second 
proceeding only if there has been an enforced conviction, and vice versa, as 
prohibiting only a second set of proceedings that carry a risk of a more 
                                                
35 Dworkin 1978, pp. 22-26 
 19 
severe punishment for the individual, as only applicable within fields of law 
wherein the state exercises its ius puniendi, and in many other ways that 
take into account the punishment aspect in various ways. Alternatively, it 
can be understood as prohibiting double prosecution, period. Now, it would 
of course be difficult to define the concept of ”prosecution” without that of 
”punishment”, so this division is hardly a dichotomy but rather a dimension, 
but it is one apparent in many aspects of ne bis in idem.36 
 
Many commentators go so far as to suggest that these two dimensions when 
taken together actually reveal two different legal norms, a rule that prohibits 
repeated prosecution, and a principle that prohibits repeated prosecution. In 
German doctrine these are known as the Erleidigungsprinzip and the 
Anrechnungsprinzip.37 However, this essay does not accept that this division 
is necessary, but will rather add the two dimension to its array of analytical 
tools. 
2.3 Ne Bis in Idem: the Central Issues 
This section will introduce the specific aspects of ne bis in idem which will 
be in focus during the rest of this essay. As will be apparent from the 
discussion above, there is no hegemonical model for analysis of ne bis in 
idem, but rather only a rudimentary conceptual and issue-based framework. 
In light of this, it has been deemed prudent in an essay of this type to adopt 
a somewhat superficial and promiscuous attitude to the concepts used. It 
would be preferrable, of course, to be more specific, but the available 
material and the limits of the essay have made such an approach impossible. 
 
2.3.1 Idem 
Idem, literally ”the same”, signifies what a judgment is in respect of, what is 
its object, which must be the same in the two procedures for ne bis in idem 
                                                
36 Lelieur 2013, pp. 203 
37 van Bockel 2009, pp. 36-40 
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to apply. The issue is an age-old problem which is traditionally analysed by 
reference to two ideal types, one focusing on the historical facts underlying 
the judgment, the other on the legal classification used in the procedure.38 
 
However, upon closer examination this approach is unsustainable. The 
process of translating an underlying reality into legal concepts is an 
inseparable part of any legal system which can not be gone through without 
instilling the product with an inextricable legal quality. That is, the grounds 
of, for example, a aggravated assault can never be just the physical acts of 
moving your fists in such-and such a pattern, because the legal system 
works by slicing and joining together aspects of another reality into 
normative concepts, that is ”conduct”.39 
 
So, rather than a simple choice between a legal and a factual approach, the 
definition of idem is always an issue of balancing the influence of historical 
or physical facts and the legal understanding of those facts. This non-factual 
dimension allows for considerations of, for example, the intention of the 
accused, the type of law that adresses the conduct, and the territory in which 
it took place.40 
 
2.3.2 Finality 
Many international instruments, including those that will be in focus in this 
essay, use some variation of the word ’final’ to qualify the application of ne 
bis in idem.41 In respect of this concept, it should first be noted that it is one 
of the many ambiguous terms connected to ne bis in idem. That judgments 
shall be final in the sense that they shall prevent any subsequent procedure 
on the same matter and thereby any contradicting judgment, that is that they 
have negative Rechtskraft, is of cource the effect of ne bis in idem. That is, 
finality is, in one sense, what is prescribed by ne bis in idem once certain 
                                                
38 Vervaele 2005, p. 101 
39 Trechsel, 2005 p. 393-394 
40 Van Bockel 2012, p. 332-333 
41 See, for example, Article 4 of protocol 7 to the ECHR and Article 14 § 7 of the ICCPR  
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conditions are fulfilled. On the other hand many of the provisions 
mentioned above seem to make finality a condition for application of the 
principle. 42 Certainly much doctrine as well as caselaw supports this view. 
However, the same concept cannot at the same time be both a condition for 
and the effect of ne bis in idem.  Therefore, it would seem that the condition 
of finality has to mean something else than negative Rechtskraft. 
 
In the context of a version of ne bis in idem with a scope extending across 
more than one jurisdiction however, a possible meaning of a condition of 
finality, which qualifies somewhat the conclusion of the above paragraph, is 
that it signifies the finality of a judgment within one of the constituent 
jurisdictions. In that case, finality as an effect would apply to one or more of 
the jurisdictions included in the scope of the principle. In this understanding, 
ne bis in idem would say, simply, that once a judgment has negative 
Rechtskraft in one jurisdiction, it shall reverberate throughout its 
jurisdictional scope.43 
 
On the other hand, it is just as possible in such a situation to define the 
condition of finality autonomously in one of the sources of law constituting 
the authority of the particular version of the principle. In such cases 
considerations of, for example, what types of judicial decisions can have 
finality, at what point in time they acquire it and secondary considerations 
as to the importance of for instance their content seem close at hand.44 
 
2.3.3 Material and Jurisdictional Scope 
Ne bis in idem provisions, even those established in international 
instruments, have traditionally been limited in their scope to internal 
application within national jurisdictions. The irregular appearance of ne bis 
in idem from a comparative perspective is often given as the main reason for 
                                                
42 For an example of this ambiguity see van Bockel 2009, p. 45-48 
43 Schomburg 2012, p. 314 
44 van den Wyngaert et. al. 1999, p. 797 
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a jurisdictional limitation of the principle in an international context. This 
variability, which should be apparent after reading this essay, is certainly 
problematic to the intrajurisdictional application of the principle. Perhaps 
more fundamental however is the unwillingness of states to compromise 
sovereignty in the field of criminal law, which is seen as essential to the 
authority and the effectiveness of the state. It is as a consequence of this rare 
for national jurisdictions to recognise foreign judgments as having the 
effects of res judicata. This is an aspect of the international order and 
justifications derived from the ne bis in idem principle on a national level 
are not common.45 
 
It is common, within national jurisdictions, to separate between the 
procedures and penalties of criminal law and penalties and procedures of an 
administrative nature. That is, penalties or procedures are organised by 
reference to the type of law that they are a part of. Ne bis in idem is 
generally construed as unable to translate between these different legal 
spheres. That is, causes from one of the spheres does not usually trigger ne 
bis in idem effects in the other. The principle can also be understood as 
applicable with different weight in different legal spheres.46 
 
The acceptability of such limitations in light of the EU rules on ne bis in 
idem will be considered below, where they will be sorted as the material and 
jurisdictional dimensions of ne bis in idem. 
 
                                                
45 Conway 2003, p.218 
46 Vervaele 2013, pp. 115-116 
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3 Preliminary Notes on the 
Context of Ne Bis in Idem in EU 
Law 
 
Ne bis in idem has traditionally been construed as a principle of criminal law 
applicable within national jurisdictions.47 In the context of EU law this 
poses something of a problem. The EU forms a new legal order for which 
direct comparisions with state jurisdictions are of limited relevance. This 
can be seen, specifically, in the difficulty to transpose the category of 
criminal law as such as well as many of its constituent elements to the 
supranational level. 
 
So, in EU law, by necessity if ne bis in idem is to have any traction its 
material and jurisdictional limits must be reformulated. What does 
determine those borders will be discussed below, but this section will forego 
that discussion somewhat by introducing cursorily those areas of law in 
which the principle has appeared most prominently. To be sure, the 
somewhat anachronistical placement of this section is problematic. 
However, since this section does not form part of the core of the essay but 
rather provides some necessary background information it has been decided 
that it will be preferrable to deal with before rather than after the sources of 
ne bis in idem in EU law. The necessarily preliminary and general nature of 
the link between the content of this section and the ne bis in idem principle 
should however be noted. 
 
                                                
47 Vervaele 2005, p. 100 
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3.1 ”Criminal Law” in the EU 
 
After a long and arduous journey, EU criminal law competences are now 
relatively neatly regulated in title V of the TFEU, more specifically, the 
procedural and substantive competences are given in articles 82 and 83 
respectively. 
 
Secondly, the concept of criminal law within the context of the EU 
incorporates a tension between European integration on one hand and state 
sovereignty on the other, which for a long time this issue was laying 
dormant within the framework of European integration in the EU context.48 
However, with the development of the Union into an ”area of freedom, 
security and justice”, and its merge with the internal market after the 
conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, brings this conflict into relief.49 
 
Thirdly, perhaps the prime example of the emergence of this tension is the 
establishment of mutual recognition as the ”cornerstone” of cooperation 
within the area of freedom, security and justice. Inspired by internal market 
principles, it means essentially that judicial decisions, including 
judgmements, of one Member State shall be recognised and executed by 
another. Several instruments on judicial cooperation incororating the 
principle of mutual recognition have been issued, beginning with the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, which is still perhaps 
the most famous example.50 It has been supplemented by various other 
instruments and together they constitute a framework for judicial 
cooperation based on the mutual recognition principle. Most of these 
instruments contain ne bis in idem provisions as voluntary refusal grounds. 
                                                
48 Mitsilegas, 2009, p.56 
49 Klip, 2009 p. 19 
50 Mitsilegas 2009, pp. 116-122 
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In the context of the European Arrest Warrant, however, the relevant ne bis 
in idem provision obliges Member States to refuse cooperation.51 
 
Lastly, while it has for a long time been assumed that the EU lacked 
competences in criminal law as such,52 the Union has instead relied on its 
competence to define offences and sanctions of a ”non-criminal” nature to 
enforce its interests.53 This is the case for example in the law of the 
environment and of public procurement, but the most notable example of 
this is found in the field of EU competition law.54 In other areas of Union 
law, such as agricultural law, while their ultimate enforcement is left to the 
Member States, the Union nevertheless provides both the source and the 
substance of administrative penalties.55 
3.2 EU Competition law 
Competition law became part of the legal order of what is now the EU by 
virtue of articles 85-90 of the original Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community in 1958. Considering the fact that of the six founding 
Member States, two at that time had no national competition law at all and 
two had systems based on abuse control rather than straight-out prohibition 
of cartels and abuse of dominant position, the inclusion of the named 
provisions should be considered extraordinarily progressive.56 
 
In order to give effect to the treaty rules on competition, an implementing 
regulation57  was adopted in 1962. For a number of reasons, the structure 
opted for was one of centralisation, with the Commission monopolising the 
competence to apply the treaty provisions on competition. Through a broad 
interpretation of the applicability of those provisions by the ECJ, the scope 
of community competition law developed to become very extensive. When 
                                                
51 Ouwerkerk 2011, p. 1699 
52 Asp 2012, pp. 37-38 
53 Herlin-Karnell, 2012b, p. 332 
54 Van Bockel 2009, p. 59 
55 Harding 2000, pp. 378-379 
56 Brammer 2009, pp. 7-8 
57 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17/62, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204–211 
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combined, these two facts meant that the commission in time became quite 
overburdened by its competence and in time it became clear that the 
situation was unsustainable.58 
 
Before turning to the reform of the earlier system, however, two aspects of 
that system should be noted. First, the rudimentary character of the 
framework on procedure in competition proceedings laid down in the 
abovementioned regulation along with the generally proactive stance of the 
Court of Justice at the time combined to form a particularly suitable 
environment for the development of community law in general and the 
principle of ne bis in idem in particular.59 
 
Secondly, and notably, the wide competence of the commission to sanction 
cartels did not mean that national competition law and NCAs were 
completely marginalised. In a seminal judgment, to which we will have 
reason to return when considering the sources of the ne bis in idem 
principle, the procedural division of competences between the national 
authorities and the EU was first set out.60 
 
In 2003, however, persistent calls for the reformation of the centralised 
system of enforcement of EU competition law finally led to a new 
regulation61 which replaced regulation 17/62. The new system of 
enforcement is one of parallel enforcement, where the Commission and 
national authorities all are competent to apply the treaty provisions on 
competition.62 However, it is still the ambition that each case should be 
handled by a single authority.63 To this end, the regulation with 
complementing instruments set up a ”European Competition Network” 
intended as an instrument for the allocation of cases between the different 
authorities. The rules set out in the relevant instruments are not binding but 
                                                
58 Slot 2004, p. 468. 
59 Ibid, p. 447 
60 Van Bockel 2009, p. 84 
61 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25 
62 Ibid, Arts. 4-6 
63 Ibid, recital 18 
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only set out the criteria that are to be applied in order to determine whether 
or not an authority is ”well placed” to deal with a particular case. The 
presumtion is that the first authority to come inte contact with the case 
should continue to handle it. Apart from these guidelines the regulation 
provides no rules on the determination of jurisdiction between the 
authorities of different Member States. 64 
 
There are also some noteworthy provisions on the relationship between the 
Commission and the national authorities. Article 11 (6) states that the 
competence of national authorities to apply the treaty provisions on 
competition shall be extinguished when the Commission chooses to initiate 
proceedings. In order to ensure the uniform application of Union law, 
Article 16 states that national authorities may not make decisions that would 
run counter to a decision already adopted or contemplated by the 
Commission. The new regulation also determines the relationship between 
national and union law on competition in its article 3. It states that national 
authorities should always apply the union provisions in parallel with 
national competition law. It also gives that enterprises that are considered 
not to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81 cannot be 
deemed to do so by national authorities beyond the territory of that state. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
64 Van Bockel 2009, p. 95 
 28 
4 Ne Bis in Idem in EU Law 
This section will examine the legal bases of ne bis in idem in the EU. The 
authoritative sources of ne bis in idem in EU law are not as diverse as its 
interpretations, but they are nevertheless quite a few. However, two types of 
cases dominate the caselaw of the CJEU on the ne bis in idem principle and 
will also dominate this part of the essay. On the one hand, we have cases 
concerning ne bis in idem as a general principle or a fundamental right of 
EU law, now codified by article 50 of the CFR. On the other hand we have 
the caselaw on articles 54-57 of the CISA, which provisions have formed 
part of EU law since their incorporation at the time of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 
 
There are many other relevant provisions which should be mentioned, even 
if they will not be discussed in depth in this essay. As mentioned above, 
many mutual recognition instruments contain ne bis in idem provisions as 
optional grounds to refuse cooperation, and the FDEAW even includes it as 
an obligatory refusal ground. Outside the AFSJ, important provisions are 
found in the regulation65 on the protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests containing general principles governing sectoral 
regulations, and in the EU convention66 on corruption. 
 
4.1 Ne Bis In Idem as a Fundamental Right 
in EU Law 
 
Article 6 TEU provides the sources of fundamental rights in the EU. As 
mentioned above, the Union is now obliged to accede to the ECHR and in 
                                                
65 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95, OJ L 312, 23.12.1995, p. 1–4 
66 Convention of 26 May 1997, OJ C195/2 
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the future the convention will be one of the direct sources of fundamental 
rights in the Union. For now, though, its influence remains indirect. Instead, 
the two main sources of fundamental rights are the CFR, which has the 
same legal value as the treaties, and the general principles of EU law, of 
which the ECHR together with the common constitutional traditions of the 
member states are the indirect source. 
 
This section will consider ne bis in idem as a fundamental right of EU law. 
In accordance with the limitations set out above, the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States will not be considered here. Rather, the 
consideration of the general principle will focus on the ECHR version and 
the role of the general principle in the caselaw of the CJEU. Before moving 
on to consider those sources, the general principles of EU law, the CFR and 
their internal relationship will be considered. 
 
4.1.1 Article 50 of the CFR and the General 
Principles of EU law 
 
The concept of general principles of EU law of course precedes the CFR by 
several decades. The early years of European integration saw the 
development by the union courts of a system of grounds of review of union 
and Member State action derived from the administrive law traditions of the 
member states.67 In parallell, motivated essentially by concerns about the 
consequences of the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law for the legitimacy 
of the Union vis-a-vis the Member States as well as internationally 
fundamental rights, as constructed from the ECHR and the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States developed as part of the 
general principles.68 
 
                                                
67 Craig et.al. 2011, pp. 109-110 
68 de Búrca 2011, pp. 477-480 
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As will be elaborated on below, ne bis in idem has figured in the caselaw of 
the CJEU since the late sixties and is now habitually referred to as such a 
”General Principle” and a ”Fundamental Right”.69  
The EU now of course has its own binding catalogue of rights in the CFR. 
However, when interpreting the CFR, due account must be taken to the 
other sources of law within the EU. Most notably, those rights that 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR shall be given the same 
meaning as the latter.70 In addition the preamble to the CFR affirms that the 
rights of the Charter result from the same sources as the General Principles 
of EU law, in addition to the caselaw of the CJEU and the ECtHR and the 
social charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe. 
 
Apart from this the treaties remain silent on the subject of the relationship 
between the CFR and the general principles of EU law as a source of 
fundamental rights. The issue has thereby been left to the courts which have 
also, thus far, remained relatively reticent. Absent any ”hard case” that 
forces the issue, the tendency seems to be to treat the CFR less as an 
exclusive source of fundamental rights than one provision among many.71  The version of ne bis in idem found in the CFR reads as follows: 
 
Article 50  
Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal 
proceedings for the same criminal offence  
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already 
been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in 
accordance with the law. 
 
                                                
69 See e.g. Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to 
C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij [2002] ECR I-8375, para. 59 
and Case C-289/04 P Showa Denko v Commission [2006] ECR I-5859, para. 50 
70 CFR Art. 52, para. 3 
71 Hofmann et.al. 2013, pp. 74-76 
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On the face of it, it would seem that the charter version only applies to 
criminal proceedings, but that it applies both to the cumulation of 
proceedings and punishment. The definition of ”finality” seems to be 
limited to acquittal or conviction. 
 
The preamble to the CFR also states that the CJEU, when interpreting the 
rights contained in the charter, shall have ”due regard to the explanations 
prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which 
drafted the Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium 
of the European Convention.” 
 
Those explanations72 clarify two points about the Charter version of ne bis 
in idem. First, as regards the territorial application, this version is not limited 
to internal situations but applies also between the jurisdiction of two or 
more Member States. In its intranational application, the Charter version 
corresponds to the ECHR version. Second, as concerns the material 
applicability, the ”rule prohibiting cumulation refers to cumulation of two 
penalties of the same kind, that is to say criminal-law penalties.” 
 
Below, we will consider in greater detail the two sources of ne bis in idem 
that are of the greatest relevance to this essay, that is the ECHR version and 
its interpretation by the ECtHR and the caselaw of the CJEU. 
4.1.2 Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR 
The relationship between the ECHR and the protection of human rights in 
the EU is close. No deeper penetration of the intricacies of that relationship 
is possible here. Suffice it to say that the ECHR has been a main source of 
inspiration for the fundamental rights of the EU for a long time, and now by 
force of the Lisbon Treaty forms a minimum standard for fundamental 
                                                
72 Available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/convent49_en.htm, 20/12/13 
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rights in the EU.73 Within the forseeable future the EU will become part to 
the convention, if not its protocols.74 
 
The ne bis in idem principle was not included at the time of drafting of the 
ECHR. However, it has since been included in the seventh protocol to that 
convention, specifically in its article four which states: 
 
Article 4 – Right not to be tried or punished twice 
 
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in 
criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State 
for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted 
or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure 
of that State. 
 
As is evident from the wording75 of the provision, this version of the ne bis 
in idem principle does not apply to transnational situations at all. Therefore 
its importance for the development of the principle on a transnational level 
is only indirect. 
 
The Explanatory Report to the protocol clarifies that while the offence in 
itself is not classified as criminal in the text of the article, this is only 
because such language is made redundant by the earlier mention of 
”criminal proceedings” and ”penal procedure”, which sufficiently clarifies 
that the article is only applicable to a criminal context. For further 
clarification, it adds that the article does not prevent the same person on 
account of the same acts being subjected also to action of a different 
character.76 
 
The explanatory report also elaborates on the requirement of finality by 
referring back to the explanatory report of another convention, the European 
                                                
73 Art. 6 TEU & art. 52 para. 3 CFR 
74 Art. 6 para. 2 TEU 
75 ”under the jurisdiction of the same state” 
76 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, paras 28 & 32 
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Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments. According 
to that text the requirement of finality demands that ”accoring to the 
traditional expression, [the decision] has acquired the force of res judicata.” 
It is also made clear that it is the national legal system which is to provide 
the relevant definition of that term.77 
 
In this connection, it is also worth noting that the protocol 7 version of the 
ne bis in idem principle has not been universally accepted by the Member 
States of the European Union. While the protocol entered into effect in 
1988, four Member States have not yet ratified the protocol at all,78 and four 
more have by various legal means assured that the provision only applies to 
offences classified as criminal under their respective national laws.79 
 
4.1.2.1 The caselaw of the ECtHR 
Unsurprisingly, considering the clear wording of the provision, the 
transnational application of the protocol 7 version of ne bis in idem has not 
been prominent in the caselaw of the ECtHR. All other areas of 
investigation of this essay are however recurring problems in the caselaw. 
While the stance of the ECtHR has not been perfectly consistent on these 
points, a relatively recent case from the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, 
Zolotukhin v Russia,80 clarified to a great extent the meaning of the version 
of the ne bis in idem principle contained in Protocol 7 and therefore 
constitutes an exemplary starting point for consideration of the principle as 
construed by the Strasbourg court. 
 
The events that form the embryo of the case took place on 4 January 2002 in 
a local police station in Russia, where Mr Zolotukhin had been brought for 
interrogation concerning an issue irrelevant to the present case. Thereafter, 
                                                
77 Ibid, paras 22 & 29 
78 Chart of Signatures and Ratifications to Protocol 7 of the ECHR found at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=20/12/2
013&CL=ENG on 20/12/13 
79 Vervaele 2013, p. 115 
80 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, (Appl. No. 14939/03), Judgment of 10 February 2009 
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in an office where he was being held, in the office of the head of the police 
station and in a car in which he was being taken to the local district court he 
verbally assaulted several officials with varying degrees of severity and 
repeatedly tried to escape using mild force. The episode ended with the 
applicant being brought before said court, where he was sentenced under the 
Russian Code of Administrative Offences to three days’ detention on the 
grounds that he had ”sworn in a public place and did not respond to 
reprimands.”81 
 
Less than a month later, Mr. Zolotukhin was indicted under the national 
Criminal Code. The grounds of this prosecution were the events of 4 
January, here more elaborately recounted and sorted under three specific 
counts of the Code. For his actions in the second office and in the car, the 
applicant was found guilty. On the first count, concerning the events that 
had taken place in the first office, he was acquitted. The judgment in this 
part mentions the fact that Mr. Zolotukhin had already been tried and 
punished under the Administrative Offences Code, but this does not appear 
to be the main reason for the acquittal.82 
 
The court in approaching the case divides it into three titles, specifically 
whether the first set of proceedings were criminal in nature, whether the two 
relevant offences were the same, and whether there had been a duplication 
of proceedings. In the headings introducing the two latter issues, the terms 
idem and bis respectively are added in brackets at the end. This formal 
approach was to be repeated in several of the following more substantial 
judgements on the principle,83 although in some the two latter issues were 
handled together.84 
 
                                                
81 Zolotukhin v. Russia, paras 12-19 
82 Ibid, paras 21-24 
83 E.g. Maresti v. Croatia, (Appl. No. 55759/07), Judgment of 25 June 2009 and 
Tomasovic v. Croatia, (Appl. No. 53785/09), Judgment of 18 October 2011 
84 Ruotsalainen v. Finland, (Application no. 13079/03), Judgment of 16 June 2009 and 
Asadbeyli and Others v. Azerbaijan, (Applications nos. 3653/05, 14729/05, 20908/05, 
26242/05, 36083/05 and 16519/06), Judgement of 11 December 2012 
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Concerning the first issue, the court held that the definition of ”criminal 
proceedings” in Article 4 of Protocol 7 must to some degree be independent 
from the classification in the legal systems of the Contracting States, since 
otherwise the object and purpose of the Convention would be 
compromised.85 The earlier caselaw cited suggests that what this 
”otherwise” signifies is an order under which the application of the 
provision to a type of situations within a Contracting State would be 
determined by the sovereign will of that state through national 
categorisations.86 The imperiled aim one assumes is that found in the 
preamble to the Convention of ” securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared.” 
 
The court also held  in Zolotukhin that the application of Article 4 of 
Protocol 7 should be determined by the same general considerations as the 
corresponding concepts used in the Convention provisions on fair trial and 
nulla poene sine lege in Articles 6 and 7.87 Little explicit rational 
justification for this later axiom can be found in the earlier caselaw of the 
court, despite its frequent reiteration. The only sentence offering any such 
justification is the statement in Göktan v. France that the meaning of the 
term ”cannot differ from one provision to another.”88 
 
The court asserts that the law applicable to the determination of criminal 
nature is consequentially the set of criteria elaborated in earlier caselaw on 
the aforementioned provisions commonly referred to as the Engel-criteria 
(after the case wherein they were first articulated). They are: the 
classification under national law, the nature of the offence, and the degree of 
severity of the penalty liable to be incurred. The first criteria is not decisive 
and indeed is often treated rather cursory in the caselaw, leading to the 
                                                
85 Zolotukhin v. Russia, para 52 
86 Storbråten v. Norway, (Appl. No. 12277/04), Decision of 1 February 2004, referring to 
Öztürk v. Germany, (Appl. No. 8544/79), Judgment of 21 February 1984 
87 Zolotukhin v. Russia, para 52 
88 Göktan v. France, (Appl. No. 33402/96), Judgment of 2 July 2002 
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primary importance of the latter two. These can, but need not necessarily, be 
applied cumulatively.89 
 
The claim that ”established caselaw” designates the Engel-criteria as 
applicable should perhaps be taken as an example of the assertive tone of 
the judgment at hand on formal issues. In fact earlier jurisprudence on 
Article 4 of Protocol 7 implies rather strongly that another, more inclusive 
set of criteria are the law when it comes to establishing the criminal nature 
of proceedings for the application of the ne bis in idem principle.90 
 
In its application of the Engel-criteria, Zolotukhin is rather typical, citing 
case law where it has earlier found the classification of an offence as an 
administrative one under the Russian system has been misguiding, thereby 
establishing the element of doubt which means that the other two criteria 
will be decisive. Concerning the second criteria, the court finds that the 
purpose of the provision is to protect values and further objectives that are 
strongly related to criminal law. This along with the indeterminate address 
of the provision points towards inclusion in the convention definition of 
criminal charge. There is no requirement of any specific gravity of the 
offence. As concerns the third criteria, this is determined by reference to the 
maximum penalty liable to be imposed. The actual penalty incurred is not 
irrelevant, but it leaves the persuasive authority of the abstract penal value 
of the provision intact. When loss of liberty is a possibility or an actuality, 
there is a strong presumption in favour of a criminal nature. In the case at 
hand therefore, both the second and the third criteria pointed in the same 
direction and the court accordingly concludes that the ”administrative” 
proceedings conducted against Mr Zolotukhin were in fact to be regarded as 
criminal within the meaning of the convention.91 
 
                                                
89 Zolotukhin v. Russia, para 53 
90 See, for example Nilsson v. Sweden, (Appl. No. 73661/01), Decision of 13 December 
2005 and Haarvig v. Norway, (Appl. No. 11187/05), Decision of 11 December 2007 in 
addition to the aforementioned Storbråten v. Norway 
91 Zolotukhin v. Russia, paras 53-57 
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Turning to the question of what sort of identity is required between the two 
sets of proceedings for their combination to be incompatible with the ne bis 
in idem principle, in other words what constitutes idem for the purposes of 
the principle, the court gave perhaps the most important precedent of the 
case. 
 
Recognising that its earlier jurisprudence had treated the issue in several 
different ways,92 and that this was detrimental to the value of legal certainty, 
the court proceeds to designate the future approach, namely that the issue of 
idem should be solved by reference to the ”facts which constitute a set of 
concrete factual circumstances inextricably linked together in time and 
space, the existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a 
conviction or institute criminal proceedings.” 
 
This is justified, in essence, by reference to the comparatively higher level 
of protection and legal certainty afforded the holder of the right by such an 
interpretation. Such an approach is warranted by the aim of the Convention 
and the value of effective enforcement of the rights found therein.93 
The citation of an array of international instruments incorporating the 
principle shows the universalist tendency of the court, however, despite the 
less-than-uniform findings of such an analysis, the court explicitly uses the 
approach based on the material acts as established in the case law of the 
CJEU on 54 CISA as the starting-point and the conclusion of its reasoning 
in this part. It should be noted, however, that the court also refers to the 
Inter-American Court of human rights, a fact that perhaps suggests that the 
courts approval of the facts-based approach rather than the relation between 
the two European courts formed the basis for the outcome. 94 
 
The last title, ”whether or not there had been a duplication of proceedings”, 
adresses the relevance of several different issues for determining whether or 
                                                
92 Ibid, para 70 
93 Ibid, para 78-84 
94 Ibid, para 79 
 38 
not a set of proceedings conducted against an individual are to be recognised 
as sufficiently serious to warrant application of the ne bis in idem principle. 
 
Most important for the purposes of this essay, the first point addressed under 
this title is that of finality. On this issue the court has been consistent over 
the years. As mentioned above, the meaning of finality is elaborated in the 
Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 and in Zolotukhin the court reiterated a 
strong line of jurisprudence that conjoins the concept of finality with that of 
res judicata. That status is traditionally reached at the time when ordinary 
remedies are no longer available or have been exhausted or when they have 
not been used by the parties before their expiration. Extraordinary remedies 
are not relevant to the determination of finality.95 Earlier case law also 
supports the notion that such evaluation must be made with reference to 
national law.96 However, there are indications that the material content of 
judgments has some importance in the determination of finality, as in an 
aerly decision on admissibility, a plea relying on article 4 of protocol 7 was 
rejected because the discontinuance of proceedings by a public prosecutor 
did not ”amount” to an acquittal or conviction.97 
 
The ECtHR does not interpret the phrase ”finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State” in Article 4P7 as 
referring to any criterium for determination of the material extent of ne bis 
in idem, but as an indication that finality shall be assessed with reference to 
the framework provided by national procedural law.98 This does not mean, 
however, that the court has opted simply to underwrite national definitions 
of finality. Rather, the assessment shall be made in view of the ”traditional” 
expression of res judicata, something which the court defines as the 
abscence of ordinary appeals.99 
                                                
95 Ibid, paras 107-108 
96 See Storbråten v. Norway cited above, and Nikitin v. Russia (Appl. No. 50178/99), 
Judgment of 20 July 2004 
97 Smirnova and Smirnova v. Russia, (Appl.nos. 
46133/99 and 48183/99), Decision of 3 October 2002 
98Storbråten v. Norway, (Appl. No. 12277/04), Decision of 1 February 2004 
99 Nikitin v. Russia (Appl. No. 50178/99), Judgment of 20 July 2004 
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The other two sub-headings sorted under this last title have to do with the 
consequences of the fact that the applicant was acquitted of one of the 
charges in the second set of proceedings. 
 
First, the court handles the issue of whether the fact that Mr Zolotukhin had 
actually been partly acquitted meant that in this part there had been no 
duplication of proceedings. The court reiterated, again in quite assertive 
language, the precedent from its earlier case law100 that the Convention 
provides three levels of protection: the rights not to be punished, not to be 
tried and not to be liable to be tried twice. The wording of the Article was 
used to support this conclusion. The combination of the words ”punished” 
and ”tried”, it is said, would be redundant unless they were each given an 
independent meaning. Consequentially, the mere fact that Mr Zolotukhin 
had been prosecuted on basis of the same acts meant that there had been a 
breach of the ne bis in idem principle.101 
 
This facet of the case clarifies, to some degree, an issue that has earlier been 
quite muddled in the case law of the court. One line of case law emphasises 
the incompatibility of consecutive prosecutions.102 The argument based on 
the wording of the article is a common justification for this approach and it 
has been supported by reference to the CFR and the ICCPR.103 
 
However, there have also been indications that the imposition of successive 
penalties is the relevant requisite for application of the principle. In a case 
from 1998, the court supported its finding that the consequtive prosecution 
of separate offences originating in the same act is allowed by Article 4 of 
Protocol 7 by noting that such procedure is not contrary to the principle 
                                                
100 Nikitin v. Russia, para. 36; Franz Fischer v. Austria, (Application no. 37950/97), 
Judgment of 29 May 2001, para. 29 
101 Zolotukhin v. Russia, paras 110-111 
102 See Gradinger v. Austria, (Application no. 15963/90) Judgment of 23 October 1995, 
para. 53; Franz Fischer v. Austria, para. 29 
103 Zigarella v. Italy, (Application no. 48154/99), Decision of 3 October 2002 
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”especially where … the penalties are not cumulative.”104 This case 
resurfaced again in 2005 when the court reiterated it, adding that the 
repetitive aspect of prosecution or punishment is central to the legal 
problem adressed by Article 4 of Protocol 7.105 
 
Returning to the last section of the Zolotukhin judgment, the court also 
confirmed that there are exceptional cases where, though there has been a 
breach of the principle, the status of the applicant as a victim could be 
extinguished. Specifically, this would be the case where an institution in one 
of the Contracting States has brought proceedings without knowledge of the 
existence of a previous judgment and has taken measures to prevent a 
breach of the principle upon gaining access to this information.106 
 
 
4.1.3 CJEU Case law on ne bis in idem as a 
Fundamental Right 
Even before the paradigm shift in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
on general principles, legal arguments based on the ne bis in idem principle 
were invoked and to a certain degree, accepted by the CJEU. One respected 
commentator writes that European integration ”stumbled upon” the issue of 
ne bis in idem.107 
 
This section will consider the case law which has since developed. It will 
begin by considering the material dimension, which will also serve to 
identify the different areas of law in which the principle has been discussed. 
From there, it will move on to the consider the link between the principle, 
jurisdiction and territory, which forms a particularly muddled issue in the 
                                                
104 Oliveira v. Switzerland, (Application no. 25711/94), Judgment of 30 July 1998, para. 27 
105 Nikitin v. Russia, para. 35 
106 Zolotukhin v. Russia, paras. 113-115 
107 Vervaele 2005, p. 106 
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case law. After considering these specific issues, it will consider further the 
meaning of Idem and Bis in the case law. 
 
4.1.3.1 Material Applicability 
From the general part above we can recollect that ne bis in idem has 
traditionally worked as a criminal law principle, limited within national 
jurisdictions to the field there recognised as criminal law. In the context of 
EU law on the other hand, the concept of ”criminal law” cannot serve the 
purpose of delineating the proper material scope of ne bis in idem. Contrary 
to what one would perhaps expect, this has not meant that ne bis in idem as 
a general principle has been without relevance in the EU legal order. 
Actually, it has been applied by the CJEU since the late sixties. 
 
How does this equate? Well, as discussed above, situations where the 
structure of EU Law approximates certain aspects of criminal law to such a 
degree as would suggest the applicability of ne bis in idem have been a part 
of EU law since long before the Lisbon Treaty, and this has caused 
applicants and national courts to raise issues of ne bis in idem before the 
CJEU with varying degrees of success and sensibility. In response to such 
arguments, the CJEU has reacted variously: with silence, with caution, and 
upon rare occasion with acceptance and endorsement. But it has not been 
completely deaf to such considerations, and so, it is now obvious that ne bis 
in idem as a general principle has some extent in the legal order of the EU 
and consequentially that the material dimension at least has not been 
understood so severely as to reduce the scope of the principle to nil. 
 
However, while the principle has been discussed in a variety of areas of EU 
law there has not been much substantial consideration of the material 
dimension as such. The considerations that have caused the CJEU to 
consider the material dimension satisfied in some cases have not been 
clearly laid out in the case law. Definitively, nothing resembling a rule like 
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that of the Engel criteria had been developed in the CJEU case law by 
2009.108 
 
However, while there is no apparent method whereby the CJEU considers 
the material dimension, an account of the various types of cases in which 
the principle has appeared is indeed possible and capable of providing if not 
some small intimation of the material nature of the general principle of ne 
bis in idem then at least useful background to the further discussion of its 
various other aspects. 
 
In attempting to construct such a typology of cases concerning ne bis in 
idem, what immediately becomes apparent is the overwhelming dominance 
of the field of competition law. In fact, while the jurisprudence derived from 
other areas is invariably limited to a single, a few, or a handful of cases, the 
discussion of ne bis in idem in competition law has been ongoing since the 
argument first appeared in Walt Wilhelm in 1969. Since then, the 
applicability of the principle to that field has been implicitly confirmed 
many times before, in LVM, it was explicitly confirmed.109 Interestingly, 
within the legal order of the EU, competition proceedings are indubitably 
considered to be not of a criminal nature.110 
 
Why the field of competition law is so dominant this essay shall not 
presume to say, but the uneven landscape of the case law inevitably has the 
effect of elevating EU competition law to a place of high importance for the 
role of the ne bis in idem principle in the EU. The field of competition law 
will therefore dominate the discussion to follow. 
 
While EU Competition law is the dominant field of application of ne bis in 
idem as a fundamental right outside the scope of the CISA provisions, the 
cases from areas of law other than that of competition law are important to 
                                                
108 Van Bockel 2009, p. 157 
109 Van Bockel 2009, p. 44 
110 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25, 
art. 23, para. 5 
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forming an understanding of the material scope of the principle and many 
will also figure to some degree in the discussion to follow. 
 
In Gutmann, the first case on ne bis in idem before the CJEU, the principle 
resulted in the quashing of a staff disciplinary measure adopted by the 
commission of the EAEC because of the failure of the commission to 
produce sufficient facts to enable distinction between the grounds of the 
decision and ”all other earlier or later grounds of complaint.” The 
applicability of the principle is not discussed, but the argument is treated 
seriously and indeed, determined the outcome of the case.111 
 
In Maizena,112 a case concerning the forfeiture of securities under an 
agricultural support scheme, two other fundamental criminal law principles 
(nulla poena sine lege and in dubio pro reo) were deemed inapplicable 
because neither of the sanctions involved were of a criminal law nature.113 
The accounting principle on the other hand (referred to in the case as non bis 
in idem) ”must be considered from the point of view of the principle of 
proportionality.” However, the forfeiture of two securities triggered by the 
same event cannot be considered disproportionate where the two securities 
have different purposes.114 
 
Ne bis in idem has also been discussed in a small number of infringement 
proceedings against Member States. In this context, the court has mentioned 
that the issue of whether the material dimension forbids application of ne bis 
in idem is unresolved and suggested that that issue would have to be 
determined in order for the ne bis in idem principle to come into effect.115 
 
Invariably, though, the court has dismissed these cases by reference to other 
aspects of ne bis in idem. The most common approach is to refer to some 
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112 Case 137/85 Maizena Gesellschaft mbH v. BALM [1987] ECR 4587 
113 Ibid, paras 11-14 
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fatal difference. Sometimes, this difference relates quite closely to the 
narrow definition of idem given above. In Italy v commission, the court 
states that the two repeated proceedings at stake relate to different 
provisions of the infringed Directive and therefore to the infringements of 
different obligations.116 In Commission v Luxembourg it limited itself to 
noting that the ”matters of fact and law involved” were not identical.117 
Various other grounds for dismissal of the argument ne bis in idem have 
also been used, most based on the concept of difference: the subjective 
scope or identity,118 the lack of finality of the other set of proceedings 
and,119 interestingly, the circumstance that the two penalties involved had 
different functions.120 
 
So, to sum up, clearly the ne bis in idem general principle of EU law does 
not materially follow the contours of the category ”criminal law” in the 
same but must be wider. With that said, neither the method nor the extent of 
the material limitations on the principle have been clearly laid out. 
 
4.1.3.2 Transnational applicability 
Article 50 of the CFR now states that the element that triggers that provision 
is a first acquittal or conviction ”within the union”. However, when we 
consider the case law of the CJEU on the jurisdictional dimension of the 
General Principle ne bis in idem, another, more complicated picture appears. 
The account of this aspect of the principle will take us deeper into the 
territory of ne bis in idem application in the field of competition law. We 
will begin with the first time the principle appeared in the context of 
competition proceedings. 
 
Walt Wilhelm121 was to fundamentally influence the understanding of ne bis 
                                                
116 Case C-127/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8305, para. 28 
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in idem in competition proceedings. As mentioned above, the administrative 
structure of the field was poorly defined in legislation, for which reason 
many essential issues of procedure were left to the CJEU. Walt Wilhelm 
concerned one such issue, namely the acceptability of the parallel 
application of union law by the Commission and national law by national 
authorities to the same anti-competitive conduct. 
 
In its reply, the court focused more on the procedural framework provided 
by regulation 17/62 than the notion of fundamental rights,122 which at this 
time was still held at arms length by the court,123 and the term ne bis in idem 
was not used in the answer. 
 
The acceptability of parallel application was found, rather, to follow from 
the special system of the sharing of jurisdiction between the Community and 
the Member States with regard to cartels, and so long as the relationship 
between national and community law has not been further regulated, no 
means of avoiding the possibility of parallell proceedings is to be found in 
the general principles of Community law.124 Essential to this  reasoning was 
the idea that Community and National law ”consider cartels from different 
points of view” and ”pursue different ends”. While the community provision 
regard cartels in the light of obstacles which may result for trade between 
Member States, each body of national legislation proceeds on the basis of 
the considerations peculiar to it and considers cartels only in that context. 
This “implies” that parallel procedures are, in principle, acceptable.125 
In addition, regulation 17/62 did not regulate the relationship between 
national law and community law, nor the competence of national authorities 
to apply national law. The regulation did include a provision authorising the 
Council to do this, but this competence had not at the time been exercised, 
which was taken as a further indication for the acceptability of parallell 
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proceedings.126 
 
The possibility of concurrent sanctions does not change this. If, however, 
the possibility of two procedures being conducted separately were to lead to 
the imposition of consecutive sanctions, a “general requirement of natural 
justice” demands that any previous punitive decision must be taken into 
account in determining any sanction which is to be imposed.127  
The only limitation imposed by EU law on the application by national 
authorities of national competition law is that it may not compromise the 
effective application of EU law. The governing principle emphasised in the 
judgment is not ne bis in idem, but the principle of the supremacy of EU 
law.128 
 
Although it was heavily imbibed with the particularities of its time and has 
been subject to modification, Walt Wilhelm in 2009 still enjoyed a very 
strong posision in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, and many of its essential 
precedents had been preserved.129 Chief among those is the acceptability of 
parallel proceedings on the community and national levels which as we have 
seen is supported by the argument that community and national laws 
”pursue different ends” or ”consider cartels from different points of view”. 
This argumentation is not very clear, and the different doctrinal strands on 
and in the stance of the CJEU on parallel proceedings has been quite 
variable through the years. 
 
Nevertheless, Walt Wilhelm had effectively set the scene for three decades 
of competition law enforcement in the EU. Apart from a judgment from -72 
concerning the applicability of the accounting principle to situations 
involving non-member states, to which we will return shortly, no other case 
on ne bis in idem in competition proceedings reached the ECJ until the turn 
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of the milleniae, in the midst of fundamental changes in the field of 
competition law, of human rights in the EU, and of the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
 
The first case of relevance in this context from the ”new wave” of case law 
on ne bis in idem was the Aalborg case.130 In that case, the court began its 
consideration of the principle by the following formulation formulation. 
”[T]he application of [the ne bis in idem principle] is subject to the threefold 
condition of identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal 
interest protected. Under that principle, therefore, the same person cannot be 
sanctioned more than once for a single unlawful course of conduct designed 
to protect the same legal asset.”131 
 
Sorting out the subjective identity, what remains of the “threefold 
condition” is the identity of the facts (on which point the case was 
resolved)132 but also a last criteria, that of the legal interest protected. Not 
much more is said in the judgment itself, so we must look at the underlying 
opinion to get a better understanding of what this criteria means. 
 
The opinion on the case was authored by AG Colomer,133 who only a few 
months before had written the first opinion on the principle in the context of 
the CISA.134 The inclusion of the criteria of the “legal interest protected” is 
supported by citation of Walt Wilhelm and Maizena, and is suggested to 
ultimately rest on the idea that ius puniendi is defined by certain underlying 
interests.135 Colomer understands Walt Wilhelm as a situation where non-
application of ne bis in idem was motivated exactly by this lack of identity 
of purpose. However, the Advocate General is of the opinion that this 
argument is not sustainable because the national and community legal 
orders do, in fact, protect the same legal interest. The territorial extent of the 
infringement does not affect its nature of being able to influence the 
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common market, but only its intensity.136 
 
While the Advocate General obviously sought to explain the meaning of 
Walt Wilhelm by reference to the criteria of the ”legal interest” it is difficult 
to know to what extent the court by its inclusion of the threefold criteria in 
the issuing judgment wished to underwrite this approach. It would seem that 
at the very least the Court agreed that a teleological perspective on the 
punitive provisions applied had some relevance to the determination of the 
applicability of ne bis in idem. Its opinions on the consequences of such a 
criteria for the system of parallel application however (unlike those of the 
AG) remained obscure.  
 
In a later case, Showa Denko,137 wherein the court faced and resolved the 
issue whether Walt Wilhelm meant that ”natural justice” required the 
application of the accounting principle in situations concerning the EU and 
non-Member States, the negative answer was justified by the argument that 
the Commissions assessments when applying the community provisions on 
competition ”may” be very different from those made by authorities in third 
countries because of the different legal interests protected. On the other 
hand, the situation would be ”completely different” where only community 
and member-state law is involved. 138 
 
4.1.3.3 Further considerations of IDEM 
Exactly how the above discussion on the territorial application of ne bis in 
idem as a fundamental right relates to the concept of Idem will be further 
discussed below. In this section Idem will be considered in itself. 
 
Boehringer, the first case on ne bis in idem following Walt Wilhelm, 
concerned the submission that penalties imposed in the United States should 
be taken into account when sanctioning anti-competitive conduct in the 
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Community.139 The court avoided answering whether such an obligation 
exists in the abstract by stating that in the specific case it did not. The 
instrument used to this effect was idem. Essentially, it was held that the 
actions complained of by the sanctioning authorities were not identical 
because, even if they originated in the same set of agreements, they 
“differ[ed] essentially as regards both their object and their geographical 
emphasis.” The actions penalised can not consist in a cartel agreement in 
itself but in its application and effects.140 
 
Similarly, in Aalborg, the targeting of two different agreements forming part 
of the same cartel but with different technical objectives was found to 
preclude application of ne bis in idem.141 
 
In Italy v Commission, concerning infringement proceedings against the 
Italian government for failing to take a number of measures against the 
pollution of water prescribed by a community directive there was held to be 
no violation of ne bis in idem on the sole ground that the two decisions at 
issue were based on obligations arising from diferent provisions of the 
infringed directive.142 
 
4.1.3.4 Finality 
There has only been one case discussing the issue of finality in the context 
of ne bis in idem as a general principle of EU law. That case, LVM, was the 
first case after a decades-long hiatus in case law on ne bis in idem within the 
field of competition law. In finding that an annullment on procedural 
grounds of a sanction imposed by the Commission did not entail 
applicability of ne bis in idem, the Court argued that there must have been a 
qualitative assessment of the issue whether an offence has actually been 
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committed in order for ne bis in idem to be applicable. Since an anullment 
does not fulfill that criteria, it can not be considered an acquittal for the 
purposes of ne bis in idem. It was underlined in LVM that ne bis in idem as a 
fundamental principle was also “enshrined” in protocol 7 to the ECHR.143  
4.2 Articles 54-57 of the Schengen 
Convention 
The Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), which was 
signed in 1990, was meant to clarify and effectuate the more policy-oriented 
provisions of the Schengen Agreement, which in turn had been signed just 
five years earlier. As is made clear by the respective preambles to the 
Schengen Agreement and the CISA, the main objective of those documents 
is to further the sake of European integration by the abolition of border 
checks. The conclusion of the Schengen texts was a way of moving ahead 
with European integration for the more integration-minded Member 
States.144 
 
Such a radical remodelling of the internal judicial infrastructure between the 
original Contracting Parties was of course not unproblematic. Concerns 
about increased criminality accompanied integrational zeal in the conclusion 
of the Shengen documents and motivated the inclusion of an array of 
countervaling measures in the Convention.145 The lion’s share of the 
Convention is therefore dedicated to, for example, police and judicial 
cooperation as well as several substantive provisions,146 and was to be held 
together by the creation of a shared system for the transferral of information 
in between the contracting states the Shengen Information System (SIS).147  
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Of the greatest relevance for this essay, the CISA also contained the 
language of an ill-fated convention that had failed to lift-off just a few years 
before under the auspices of the European Political Cooperation. That was 
its provisions on ne bis in idem in articles 54-57. 148The scope and substance 
of those provisions will in relevant parts be considered below, but it is 
necessary at this point to to clarify their place in the EU today, for while the 
Schengen aquis, at it has come to be known, was originally concluded 
outside the framework of the EC, today it forms part of the EU legal order 
by virtue of a protocol to the Amsterdam treaty. As such, it is binding upon 
all the Member States save Ireland as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein.149 
 
4.2.1 Content 
 
The CISA version of ne bis in idem has been lauded as ”the most 
developed” of the EU versions of the principle,150 and indeed it stretches 
across five paragraphs and has several characteristics that set it apart from 
other written versions of the principle. 
 
The core of the CISA norms on ne bis in idem can be found in the first part 
of Article 54, which sets out the prohibition of double prosecution. What is 
most salient about this provision is that its territorial application is limited to 
transnational situations. This inter-state applicability is unique among 
international sources of the principle.151 However, it should be noted that the 
obligation is not of an erga omnes character, but only inter partes.152 That 
is, situations where a third party or the Union itself has penalised an 
individual are exempt from its scope of application. 
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The CISA explicitly distinguishes between the prohibition of double 
prosecution and the accounting principle. The first is found in Article 54, 
while the latter is set out separately in Article 56. The accounting principle 
here figures as essentially a subsidiary rule which is applied in those cases 
where double prosecution has come about despite the main rule in Article 
54. Indeed, there is no shortage of exceptions to that provision. Along with 
the general reservation that in cases where a penalty has been imposed, it 
has also been enforced contained in the second part of the first paragraph, 
the Convention provides for an extensive possibility to derogate from the 
rules a number of circumstances listed in Article 55, which has been used by 
nine Member States.153 
 
The wording and of Articles 54 and 56 CISA carries heavy criminal law 
connotations. It speaks of a ”trial” and a second ”prosecution”. The drafting 
history and the context of the provisions also suggest their limitation to a 
criminal context. However, as we have seen, the definition of criminal law 
in the EU is not clear-cut. The interest of the uniform application of Union 
law obviously argues in favour of an autonomous interpretation of the 
material application of the principle, but in the abscence of preliminary 
questions on this point, the law remains unclear.154 
 
4.2.2 CJEU Case law on the CISA Provisions 
4.2.2.1 Idem 
 
The first case on the concept of Idem in the context of the CISA was Van 
Esbroeck. It concerned the problem whether the importation of drugs into 
one member state and their exportation from another may be covered by the 
concept.155 
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The court held that the divergent legal classifications and legal interests 
protected in different Member States does not exclude application of ne bis 
in idem. Rather, idem should be understood as the ”identity of the material 
acts, understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete 
circumstances which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and 
by their subject-matter.”156 The determination of what exactly constitutes 
the material acts in any specific case is however for the national courts to 
decide. The court limits its assessment to the statement that the 
circumstances at hand may in principle constitute Idem in accordance with 
this definition.157 
 
In Van Esbroeck, this interpretation of Idem was justified by reference to the 
wording of the CISA, which in contrast with other international versions158 
of ne bis in idem uses the words ”the same acts”, not ”the same offence”.159 
Teleologically the court stated that the ultimate purpose of the provision, 
which is to ensure that the exercise of free movement is not compromised 
by the possibility of double prosecution or legal uncertainty thereto can not 
be effectively protected by a definition relying on the legal classification of 
the offence.160 The CISA provisions on ne bis in idem is not dependent on 
any harmonisation of national laws, but implies mutual trust and recognition 
between the Member States, which further supports the conclusion that 
differing legal classifications do not hinder application of ne bis in idem 
between the states.161 
 
The precendent established in Van Esbroeck and its justification has been 
stable in the following case law,162 and as we have seen has inspired the 
harmonised ECtHR approach to the concept of Idem. Interestingly it has 
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been specified that a subjective link in the form of a criminal intention is not 
enough to establish identity of the material acts.163 
 
4.2.2.2 Finality 
The first judgment on ne bis in idem in the context of the CISA was Gözütuk 
& Brügge, where the main issue was the position of out-of-court settlements 
in the scheme of the principle. More specifically, it clarified whether or not 
they triggered the principle (whether they had sufficient finality or satisfied 
the identity aspect of bis). As mentioned above, the relevant language in the 
provision is the phrase “finally disposed of”. 164 
 
In Gözütok & Brügge, the court noted three important characteristics of the 
national out-of court settlements at issue. First, the decision to accept such a 
settlement and to discuntinue further proceedings, while not involving a 
court, is nevertheless taken by an authority which is part of the criminal 
justice system. Secondly, the settlement penalises unlawful conduct. Third, 
they are a definitive bar to further proceedings under national law.165 
 
The court rallies many arguments in support of its finding that out-of-court 
settlements, thus characterised, do satisfy the conditions for application of 
ne bis in idem. Most centrally, the court cites the purpose of the provisions, 
that of securing freedom of movement and ultimately of realising the “area 
of freedom, security and justice”. That objective cannot be served unless the 
mutual trust between the criminal justice systems implied by the fact that 
the CISA makes no reference to any need of approximation of laws is 
hinged solely on the criteria for finality defined by the member state where 
the settlement was reached.166 
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So in Gözütok & Brügge, the grand plan of European integration thus 
motivated an interpretation of the CISA provisions which effectively 
establishes mutual recognition between the Member States. In a later 
judgment, the same teleological approach was used to limit the application 
of the principle by reference to the criteria of finality. In that case, Miraglia, 
finality was found not to attach to a judicial decision declaring a case closed 
on the sole ground that proceedings have already been initiated in another 
Member State without any consideration on the merits of the case. This 
decision was motivated by essentially the same language used in Gözütok & 
Brügge, that is the interest of establishing an “Area of freedom, security and 
justice.”167 
 
The trend of focusing on the type of decision in considering the issue of 
finality continued in three following cases. On the same day in 2006, two 
judgments concerning the finality of acquittals on account of lack of 
evidence and a time-bar respectively were issued.168 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the two judgments mirrored each other in their considerations. The 
acceptance of finality in both cases were motivated similarily to the above 
cases, namely by the objectives of freedom of movement and legal certainty 
and the mutual trust between member states.169 One of the cases focused on 
the formulation from Miraglia that there had been no consideration on the 
merits of the case, noting that an acquittal on account of lack of evidence 
can be considered such but also stating that it was not necessary to decide 
exactly how decisive a role that criteria should play under other 
circumstances.170 
 
Finally, in Turansky, concerning the decision of local police to suspend 
further proceedings the court focused on the fact that such a decision was 
not, under national law, a bar to further proceedings. In such circumstances, 
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the decision can not in principle be considered a trigger of the ne bis in idem 
principle. Again, it was noted that such an interpretation is compatible, at 
least, with the objective of the CISA which is not to protect a suspect from 
having to submit to subsequent investigations.171 Essentially, it was here 
held in clear language that it is national law which determines finality.172 
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5 Later Developments of ne bis 
in idem in the Case law of the 
CJEU 
 
5.1 Mantello 
The case at hand addressed Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant.173 German authorities became aware through the 
SIS of the existence of an Arrest Warrant issued by an Italian Tribunale 
concerning Mr Mantello, who they proceeded to arrest. The grounds cited in 
that arrest warrant were, firstly, having participated in cocaine trafficking 
within a criminal organisation, and secondly, unlawfully having handled 
narcotic drugs. Both offences were purported to have been continuously 
committed for more than 18 months.174 However, the accused had priorly 
been convicted on one specific count of unlawful posession of narcotic 
drugs with intent of resale comitted towards the end of that period. The 
referring court now in essence wanted to know whether such a prior 
conviction could mean that execution of the arrest warrant would be 
prohibited under the ne bis in idem-rule of the framework decision.175 
 
Specifically, the court posed two questions. Firstly, which legal system 
should govern the interpretation of the concept of the ”same acts” for the 
purposes of the framework decision: that of one of the involved Member 
States, or that of the Union. Secondly, could the earlier conviction in 
combination with the fact that the investigating authorities at that time had 
sufficient evidence to prosecute also for the offence of participating in a 
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criminal organisation, but chose not to do so, mean that a second set of 
proceedings would be prohibited also in relation to this offence, by the ne 
bis in idem principle as incorporated in the Framework Decision.176 
 
In answering the first of these questions, the court found that against the 
background of the principle of mutual recognition and in the absence of 
explicit reference to national law in the relevant provision, the interest of 
uniform application of union law calls for an autonomous interpretation of 
the term.177 
As for the content of the concept for the purposes of the Framework 
Decision, the court, supporting its decision with the similarities in wording 
and purpose between the two provisions, remarked that the meaning given 
to the term should be that which has been given in the jurisprudence on 54 
CISA.178 As related above, this is the interpretation adopted by the ECtHR 
in Zolotukhin. However, in Mantello no explicit mention of the case law of 
the European Court was made. 
 
However, the court proceeds to reinterpret the questions posed by the 
national court. It considers that they ”relate more to the concept of ‘finally 
judged’ than to that of ‘same acts’.” Actually, what needs to be answered is 
whether the fact that Italian authorities had sufficient evidence at the time of 
the concluded proceedings to prosecute also for the offences referred to in 
the Arrest Warrant but withheld that evidence meant that the finality of the 
resulting judgment extended also to those offences.179 
 
In relation to that issue, the court finds that under the Framework Decision, 
the finality of a judgment is determined by the law of the Member State 
where it was given.180 That statement is preceded by citation of language 
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which has previously operated to provide a finding of finality for the 
purposes of 54 CISA.181 
 
As is obvious from the text of the case itself, Mantello in its substance 
concerned the issues of finality and identity. However, while not explicitly 
mentioned, another issue that is relevant for the purposes of this essay was 
also decided in that case. Several Member States had intervened in the 
proceedings putting forward the argument that Article 3 (2) of the 
Framework Decision is not applicable to situations where the Arrest 
Warrant and the potential final judgment originate in the same Member 
State.182 
 
The issuing authority, it was held, is under an obligation to respect the ne 
bis in idem principle as a general principle of law, and is also the institution 
in the best position to ensure that the principle is not violated. Therefore, 
allowing the executing Member State to review the legality of the Arrest 
Warrant in light of the ne bis in idem principle would be contrary to the 
principle of mutual recognition.183 It was also claimed that Article 3(2), like 
54 CISA, only applies in transnational situations.184 
 
While the Advocate General envisioned a shared competence between the 
involved Member States, the Court of Justice does not mention this issue at 
all in its judgment. Since Article 3(2) is applied to the circumstances of 
Mantello, however, the silence of the court on this point strongly implies the 
general applicability of that article. 
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5.2 Beneo-Orafti, Bonda, and Åkerberg 
The three cases introduced in this part have been collected under a single 
heading, because insofar as this essay is concerned, they discuss the same 
issue, that is the material applicability of ne bis in idem. 
 
The company at the centre of the first of the three cases, Beneo-Orafti ,had 
produced inulin syrup in excess of its allocated amount under the common 
organisation of the sugar market. On this ground, it now faced several 
different measures, including a levy of 500 € for each tonne in excess of the 
given amount, the recovery of aid granted for the production, and a 
”penalty” of 30% of the recovered sum.185  
 
The court began its treatment of the issue by noting that ne bis in idem is 
enshrined in 50 CFR, inter alia.186 Following this, the court considered the 
measures in light of the regulation on the protection of the EC’s financial 
interests, and found that, under the provisions of that document, only one of 
them could be considered a ”penalty”. Therefore, ne bis in idem could not 
be applied. Specifically, the court argued that the recovery of aid could not 
be considered a penalty because Article 4 of the regulation states that any 
irregularity shall lead to the withdrawal of a wrongly obtained advantage, 
which shall not be considered a penalty. In relation to the levy, which 
amounted to a total of roughly 13 878 500 €, the court stated that since the 
underlying acts could not be considered an infringement of EU law, and 
because such was necessary for the imposition of administrative penalties, it 
could not be considered a penalty. 187 
 
Bonda originated in the submission of false information in an application for 
income support under the Common Agricultural Policy. By force of 
provisions on penalties in the regulation specifying the rules applicable to 
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the specific payment scheme, national authorities decided to limit the 
applicant’s access to the aid scheme for the current as well as the following 
three years. Subsequently, the applicant was the subject of criminal 
prosecution by the Member State on the basis of the same act.188 
 
These later proceedings eventually resulted in the Supreme Court of Poland 
asking the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the nature of the penalty that 
had been imposed on the defendant under the regulation. The court felt such 
interpretation was necessary in order to enable it to decide the relevance for 
the case of a national rule incororating the ne bis in idem principle. The 
national court stated that it was because of national adherence to the ECHR 
that such assessment of the penalty was necessary.189 
 
The answer of the court proceeds in two steps. It begins by determining the 
nature of the penalties under EU Law by recalling a line of case law wherein 
similar provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy have been deemed 
non-criminal in nature, and goes on to list the arguments put forth to support 
that view. In essence, those grounds are the following: First, that rules like 
the one applied in the concluded proceedings are directed against the 
prevalence of ”irregularities” which are contrary to the financial interests of 
the union as a whole. And secondly, that they are exclusively directed 
towards economic operators who have submitted themselves to the rules of 
the aid scheme by their own volition.190 
 
The second part of the answer relates the Engel criteria and their relevance 
to the present case. For the purposes of the first criterion it is said that EU 
law must in this context be what is meant by ”national law”. On the point of 
the second criterion, it is concluded, by reference to the argument related 
above concerning the purpose of the penalties and to their limited impact on 
the applicants person, that they cannot by force of that criterion be 
considered criminal in nature. The latter part of that argument is repeated in 
                                                
188 Case C-489/10 Bonda [2012] ECR I-0000, paras. 17-19 
189 Ibid, paras. 23-25 
190 Ibid, paras. 28-35 
 62 
finding that neither the third Engel criterion justifies any other conclusion 
than that the penalties are not of a criminal nature. The findings of the court 
in this part are summarised in stating that the administrative nature 
established in the earlier part of the judgment ”is not called into question by 
an examination of [relevant ECtHR case-law].”191 
 
Åkerberg concerned an economic operator who first had fines imposed on 
him to the amount of 112 219 by the swedish tax authority for providing 
false information in his tax returns two years in a row, thereby enabling the 
witholding of more than SEK 600 000 (just below 70 000 €) in tax 
payments for those years, and subsequently192 was indicted at Haparanda 
District Court on a charge based on the same acts, exposing him to a 
liability to imprisonment of up to six years.193  
 
Controversy within the swedish judicial system surrounding the ne bis in 
idem principle caused a district court in Sweden to refer a number of 
interesting questions to the CJEU. Among the issues raised by those 
questions were whether the accumulation of tax penalties and criminal 
proceedings like that allowed for under Swedish law is compatible with the 
ne bis in idem principle as incorporated in Article 50 of the Charter.194 
 
In its answer the court limits itself to defining the issue on which the 
compatibility of repeated proceedings based on the same fact in the case at 
hand hinges, namely the meaning of the term ”criminal proceedings” and 
specifically, whether tax penalties should be considered to fall within that 
category. Recalling that the union recognises the concept of administrative 
penalties as distinguished from criminal ones and that in tax matters the 
member states have the freedom to shape their national system of penalties 
                                                
191 Ibid, paras. 36-44 
192 Swedish law provides for the possibility to sanction the act of providing false 
information during the taxation process by a special administrative pecuniary penalty of 
40% of the withheld amount (”tax surcharge”) as well as a possible maximum criminal 
penalty of two or six years, depending on the classification of the offence. See Law 
1990:324 on tax assessment, Ch. 5 para. 1 and Law 1971:69 on tax offences, paras. 2, 4 
193 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECR I-0000, paras. 12-13 
194 Åkerberg, para 15 
 63 
as they see fit, the court concludes that a system that utilises both tax and 
criminal penalties to enforce the collection of taxes is not as such 
incompatible with Article 50, but rather, an evaluation of the particular type 
of tax penalties must be made. Such an evaluation should apparently be 
made by reference to what the court now calls the ”relevant” criteria, 
namely the familiar Engel-criteria that in the bonda case were held more at 
arms length. However, the court considers that it is for the national courts to 
determine the actual nature of the national tax penalties.195 
 
5.3 Toshiba 
In its relevant parts Toshiba adresses the implications of the ne bis in idem 
principle for the field of EU competition law as reformed by regulation 
1/2003. At the center of the case was a cartel which had lasted for a 
significant period before its conclusion on a date less than two weeks after 
the accession of the Czech republic to the Union. The participating 
companies were fined by the Commission in a decision taken on the 24 
January 2007. Before the initiation of the proceedings that resulted in that 
decision, the Commission informed the Czech competition authorities that 
those proceedings would in all likelihood be limited to the actions and 
effects of the cartel within the territory of the Union before the date of 
accession because of the difficulty in calculating a fine for such a small part 
of the infringement.196 
 
Thereafter, national Czech authorities initiated proceedings against the same 
companies for the effects produced in the Czech territory by the cartel 
before the accession date. Like those of the Commission, these proceedings 
resulted in fines being imposed on the participants of the cartel.197 
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Subsequently the case was brought before the national courts, which 
eventually led to the referral of two questions to the CJEU. The second 
question, which is the one which is of relevance to this essay, concerned the 
eventual limiting effects on the practice of parallel procedures established 
by the Walt Wilhelm case four decades earlier of the ”new” regulation on 
competition mentioned above on the one hand, and the ne bis in idem 
principle on the other. The question is divided in two, and in answering it 
the court approaches it in two separate steps, as two separate legal issues 
arising from two separate norms. On the one hand, there is the new 
procedural rules of regulation No 1/2003 and their impact on the division of 
competences between the National Competition Authorities and the 
Commission. On the other we have the ne bis in idem principle and the 
limits it imposes on the application of national law by the national 
authorities.198 
 
As to the first issue, the court finds that the practice of parallel application 
as established in Walt Wilhelm and its chief justification in the claim that the 
national and union norms approach anti-competitive conduct from different 
perspectives ”has not been changed by the enactment of Regulation No 
1/2003.”199 This conclusion is supported in the main by reference to the 
drafting history of the regulation, which in its initial version would have 
reserved situations with international elements as the exclusive domain of 
EU law but was later changed. Another pertinent argument was Article 16 
(2) of the regulation, which states that national authorities cannot contradict 
commission decisions concerning the same situation. This, the argument 
was, would be meaningless unless parallel proceedings were allowed.200 
 
The second issue is subsumed under ne bis in idem as expressed in PVC and 
Aalborg. The court determines that the threefold condition is not satisfied by 
reference to the ”identity of facts”. The behaviour referred to in Article 81 
of the EC treaty, it is argued, must be determined with reference to its 
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temporal and spatial limitations. In the case at hand, the documentation 
provided sufficient evidence that the commission decision and that of the 
national authority concerned different consequences of the cartel. 
 66 
6 Analysis and Conclusions 
6.1 Idem 
In the context of the CISA, idem has been defined as ”identity of the 
material acts, […] a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably 
linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter”. This relatively 
factual approach has been stable in the handful of cases on the issue and has 
gained significant ground since its original elaboration in 2006. In 
Zolotukhin it was used by the ECtHR in the refurbishing of its case law on 
the issue, and it has also expanded within the AFSJ to be applied within the 
context of the EAW, as is shown clearly by Mantello. In line with the same 
reasoning, it is probable that the definition will also be applied in the 
interpretation on the various other instruments on judicial cooperation. 
 
In contrast, ne bis in idem as a general principle of EU law is subject to the 
”threefold condition” first established in Aalborg and recently confirmed by 
Toshiba. Whether this condition is intended as a definition of idem in the 
context or whether that issue is covered by the ”identity of the facts” is as of 
yet unclear. The condition obviously does not cover all aspects of ne bis in 
idem, for example not what constitutes a final judgment, so it would seem to 
be limited to issues of the repetitive identity. However, the exact 
conceptualisation of the issues of ne bis in idem here appears as 
fundamentally different from that of the ECtHR and the AFSJ approach.  
 
The more factual approach taken by in the context of the AFSJ and adopted 
by the ECtHR has been lauded in much doctrine because of its relative 
clarity and the high degree of protection it allows the individual. However, 
while its rationale as given by the ECtHR focuses exclusively on the role of 
ne bis in idem as a protector of the rights of the individual, in the context of 
CJEU case law on the CISA something is clearly different. While the rights 
of the individual are discernible in the justification given to the 
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interpretation of idem by the ECJ, they are seen as flowing from the right to 
freedom of movement, which has as much to do with the functioning of the 
internal market as with the rights of the individual. In addition, the 
motivation given for the factual interpretation of ne bis in idem in the CISA 
context also includes the mutual trust and recognition ”implied” by 54 
CISA, which is of course also furthered by the factual interpretation of 
idem. In comparison to the ECtHR reasoning, that of the ECJ appears highly 
motivated by arguments to do with the structure of EU law rather than the 
rights of the individual. 
 
But, in Mantello, the application of the CISA definition of idem also in the 
context of the EAW was justified by reference to the common purpose of 
the two versions of ne bis in idem. Interestingly, the purpose of the EAW 
provision, as given by the court in Mantello, is subtly different to that given 
in the case law on the CISA provisions in that the reference to the protection 
of the freedom of movement has disappeared. In Mantello it is instead the 
free-standing prevention of double prosecution which is given as the 
objective of both the CISA and EAW provisions. 
 
This perhaps reflects the specific context of the EAW, which lies further 
away from the grand scheme of the internal market than the Schengen 
provisions. Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that the court in its motivation 
of the principle moves away from the fundamentally economic approach of 
earlier CISA case law. Whether the court sees as the main motivation of ne 
bis in idem the protection of the individual or of the authority of judgments 
is not clear from Mantello, but the disappearance of the reference to the 
freedom of movement could perhaps be the embryo of a change of focus to 
the more fundamental roles of ne bis in idem in EU law. In this light, it is 
surprising that the court made no mention whatsoever of 50 CFR. 
 
In light of these developments in the context of the AFSJ it is perhaps 
surprising that Toshiba shows a much less rigid approach to the definition of 
idem, seemingly motivated primarily by the effective enforcement of EU 
 68 
and national competition laws rather than the traditional rationales behind ne 
bis in idem, the protection of the individual and the authority of judicial 
decisions, or the need for conceptual consistency. 
 
This is apparent not least in the interpretation given by the CJEU to the 
questions asked by the referring court. The second question posed by the 
latter authority, which is of relevance here, is divided into to sub-questions. 
The intended question seems to be the following: What are the 
consequences of the relevant provisions of regulation 2003/1 and ne bis in 
idem as incorporated in the CFR and as a general principle of EU law when 
the Commission makes a decision to bring competition proceedings for the 
competence of national authorities to a) deal with the same conduct and b) 
apply national law to the same conduct. 
 
The CJEU interprets the reference for a preliminary reference differently. It 
separates the regulation provisions from the ne bis in idem principle, 
construing the issue proposed by the national court as concerning two 
separate issues. First, the delimitation of powers between the Commission 
and national competition authorities in the context of competition 
proceedings, something  which is related to the provisions of regulation 
2003/1. Secondly, the consequences of ne bis in idem for the capacity of 
NCA:s to apply national competition law. 
 
This reformulation of the question, which seems to clash with the intent of 
the national court, shows clearly how the CJEU imposes on the issue a 
perspective in which ne bis in idem is involved only in evaluation of the 
effects of the system for enforcement of competition law in the union, rather 
than a fundamental norm superior to the provisions of regulation 2003/1 
which should be involved in the interpretation of the system of that 
regulation rather than only its effects. 
 
Having looked at the justifications of the interpretation of idem, let us 
consider the actual content of that element in the case law. Here, it should 
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first be remembered that within the context of a legal system it is impossible 
to take an entirely factual approach to the identity of judicial decisions 
because anything recognised by the legal system must by necessity itself to 
some extent be legal. There is a process of translation involved when the 
legal system interacts with other realities, and any definition of idem would 
necessarily form part of the system’s understanding of its object. From this 
perspective the reference to the ”inextricable link in space, time and subject 
matter” should perhaps not be seen as a definition of idem that is 
independent from the legal classification of the offence in the sense that it is 
scientifically determinable,201 but rather as a shift of focus within the 
spectrum of objective and formal considerations allowed by this framework. 
 
As a clarifying example, please consider the following two situations. 
 
Adams wants Brown and Cooper dead. For this purpose, he buys a bottle of 
poison, enough to kill two men. He invites Brown and Cooper to a soup 
dinner the same night. Adams prepares a bowl of food and sets a smaller 
one aside for himself, claiming he has an allergy to a specific ingredient. He 
then adds the poison from the bottle to the communal soup-bowl to be 
shared by Brown and Cooper. He puts the poisoned soup-bowl on the table 
in front of Brown and Cooper. They help themselves to the poisoned soup 
and die. 
 
Now, compare the above example to the following. Adams wants Brown 
and Cooper dead. For this purpose, he buys two bottles of poison, each 
enough to kill one man, but not two. He invites Brown and Cooper to a soup 
dinner the same night. Adams prepares three portions of soup, and pours a 
bottle of poison each into two of them. He puts a bowl of poisoned soup 
each before Brown and Cooper. They both eat their soup and die. 
 
                                                
201 Presumably, natural science uses more specified criteria than an ”inextricable link in 
time and space and in terms of subject matter” to delineate unity. 
 70 
We might be inclined to hold something like the following opinion after 
having read the above examples. Under the definition of idem given in the 
context of the CISA, it would be impossible to prosecute Adams 
consequtively for the respective murders of Brown and Cooper in the first 
situation, because the material acts (that is, serving them poisoned soup) are 
inextricably linked in time, space and by their subject matter. However, in 
the second situation, it would be possible, since there is no inextricable link 
between the murders of Brown and Cooper. That is, having poured poison 
in the bowl meant for Brown, it would not be impossible for Adams to 
abstain from putting poison in the second bowl. 
 
However, criminalisation usually entails identifying conduct by means of its 
effect rather than its purely physical side. Thus, the offence of murder in 
legislation is not defined by the physical acts constituting it, but forms a 
normative concept at the core of which lies a consequence, the death of a 
person, rather than a specified act. It is only from this source that 
considerations of causation in the physical world flow. Thus, while in the 
first example above there is certainly a very tangible confluence of multiple 
offences in a single course of conduct it is still the offence which allows us 
to identify the physical act. So it would be possible to consider as separate 
material acts the serving of poisoned soup to Brown and to Cooper even in 
the first case, even though the soup was served in the same bowl, since it is 
ultimately the separate deaths of Brown and Cooper that allow us to identify 
any aspects of the physical reality as relevant. 
 
So in addition to the component of idem that signifies a position on a 
spectrum running between the ideal types of the physical world and the 
legal definition of an offence, there is also an essential component of 
drawing boundaries between phenomena, of slicing reality into relevant 
parts. In relation to this component, referring to an ”inextricable link in time 
and space” is not saying much, since strictly speaking in the physical world 
such a link exists between all phenomena, from the big bang to any punch or 
pouring. Thus, even under a relatively factual interpretation, the stuff that 
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can form an idem is still by its nature highly legal material, and courts will 
still have to determine the limits of these components, that is, what their 
extent is, and in this the slicing and cubing of reality provided by legal 
classifications is still essential. 
 
In this perspective, it becomes apparent that the ideal types of the natural 
and legal conduct are not alternatives, but both constitute essential 
ingredients in any legal definition of the identity of judgments. That is not to 
say that the traditional terms are meaningless. However, they seem to reflect 
the values underlying ne bis in idem rather than ontological principles. That 
is, the legal unity of conduct puts the weight of ne bis in idem on the 
organisation of the legal system in the sense that it forces the legal system to 
adhere to the principle of legality. The natural unity of conduct rather 
focuses on equity and the right of the individual and puts the legal system to 
a higher standard. 
 
To be sure, the above discussion can easily seem a bit far-fetched. It would 
certainly seem counter-intuitive to consider the serving of a single bowl of 
poisoned soup as two different acts defined by the different mouths they 
eventually went into, since it is intuitive to define a criminal act by its 
intent, which in the above examples would seem to be ”Killing Brown and 
Cooper”. However, consider Toshiba. In that case, it was argued that since 
the conduct at issue was identified by its object or effect, it is justified to 
divide the conduct by reference to the division of those aims and 
consequences in spatial and temporal spheres. Certainly, this approach 
seems incompatible with the approach taken in the context of the CISA 
because it addresses the underlying acts from the other end of the spectrum, 
from their legal classification. However, that is not to say that the same 
outcome could not have been motivated also by arguments addressing first 
and foremost the ”natural acts”, since the conceptualisation of those acts 
would always have to be justified by reference to a particular offence. So, 
even if Toshiba had adopted an approach similar to that used in the context 
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of the AFSJ, the same result could have been reached by separation of the 
soup consisting of the actual, natural conduct of the involved companies. 
 
In this aspect Mantello sheds little light. It can be assumed from that 
judgment that the CJEU agrees with the national court that the grounds of 
the Italian judgment and of the arrest warrant do not constitute idem. The 
former judgment of course must be considered final, therefore, the 
consideration of whether there was a separate finality pertaining to the 
grounds of the arrest warrant would have been superfluous unless the 
grounds of the arrest warrant were not included in the earlier judgment. 
 
Since there seems to have been enough grounds available to indict for the 
second, wider offence even without inclusion of the facts underlying the 
earlier judgment, it seems reasonable that the disappearance of one possible 
constituent element through the earlier judgment should not in principle 
extend to all acts of which it could have made part if those offences might 
just as well form offences in their own right. However, it would have been 
interesting to hear what the ECJ has to say about the relationship between 
offences that are stretched out in time and space and their constituent parts 
in light of the factual interpretation of idem. 
 
6.2 Finality 
In the definition of the concept of finality among the sources considered in 
this essay, there are clear tensions running along two dimensions. One of 
these concerns the degree to which national definitions of the concept 
should be accepted, and vice versa to what degree it should be 
autonomously defined. The other dimension has to do with the substantive 
conditions for the acceptance of finality, and has in the main concerned the 
availability of appeals on the one hand and on the other the content of the 
judicial decision which triggers the principle. 
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Please note also the ambiguity inherent in the concept of finality allows for 
quite a bit of confusion. The possibility to interpret the term as referring to 
both a condition for and the effect of the ne bis in idem principle means that 
other considerations, such as for example any of the above mentioned 
specific issues, that are conditions for ne bis in idem to come into effect 
could be interpreted not as independent concepts but as components of the 
condition of finality. 
 
LVM, the only case on finality from the ECJ outside the scope of the CISA 
concerns the finality of a commission decision. Therefore, the case does not 
of course provide much information on the relationship between national 
and union law, and it is unclear what the approach would be in a case 
involving finality on the national level. It can however tell us something 
about the meaning given to finality when the ne bis in idem principle 
operates in isolation on the union level. 
 
In determining the finality of a commission decision to annull a previous 
penalising decision, the focus was on the issue of whether or not there had 
been any consideration of the substance of the case. Thus, it was argued that 
ne bis in idem depends upon a qualitative assessment of whether or not a 
particular offence has been committed and ”merely” forbids a second such 
assessment linked to the imposition of a penalty. Therefore, the 
inapplicability of ne bis in idem to an annullment could be motivated by two 
circumstances, namely that because there had been no ruling on the 
substance of the alleged facts the decision could not be regarded as an 
acquittal, and that the eventual penalties of future proceedings would not be 
accumulated with those of the annulled proceedings. 
 
This approach has been quite stable in the case law of the ECtHR. In 
relation to this, it might seem strange that the considerations of LVM were 
preceded by the confirmation that ne bis in idem is a fundamental principle 
in EU law ”also enshrined” in Article 4P7, and a general statement about its 
application in the field of competition law. Here, the finality component is 
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defined as ”[having] been penalised or declared not liable by a previous 
unappealable decision (emphasis added)”. In relation to these statements it 
seems quite odd that the substantive consideration of the issue focuses on 
the content of the decision instead of the availability of appeals. 
 
However, it should be noted that also in the ECtHR case law, 
incongruously, an early decision on admissibility from the ECtHR found 
that a decision to annull an earlier conviction, while it was a ”final” 
decision, did not trigger ne bis in idem because it did not ”amount to either 
conviction or an acquittal.” One suspects that the use of the word ”final” 
here is intended to signify something else than finality, presumably ”the 
last”. Still, the use of the expression ”amount to” suggests that the standard 
for acceptance of finality are decisions resulting from consideration of the 
substance of the case. 
 
In the context of CISA the concept of finality, like that of idem has been 
defined in relation to the goal of freedom of movement. That objective has 
established the rule that judicial decisions that definitely bar further 
proceedings under national law must be accepted as final also in 
transnational situations. (G&B, Tur) This means that at least insofar as 
finality as a condition for the application of ne bis in idem is concerned, the 
recognition of foreign res judicata has actually been imposed on the 
Member States by the ECJ. However, the objectives of the AFSJ have also 
motivated the limitation of ne bis in idem by reference to a lack of 
substantive consideration, and it is concievable that this constitutes another 
criteria for the acceptance of finality under the CISA. (Mir, Tur) 
 
Mantello unfortunately does not tell us much about the concept of finality in 
EU law other than that its interpretation seems to be consistent throughout 
the AFSJ. Also of course we learn that the mere fact that judicial authorities 
were in possession of evidence relating to particular acts at the time of the 
prosecution of a non-idem does not mean that the finality attaching to that 
prosecution extends also to the circumstances supported by the evidence.  
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Unfortunately, on a conceptual level Mantello muddies the waters. The 
original question posed by the German court was whether the unlawful 
importation of drugs of which Mantello had been convicted and 
participation in an organisation with the purpose of ilicit trafficking in such 
drugs constituted idem, especially with consideration of the fact that the 
investigating authorities were in possession of information that strongly 
supported such participation but refrained from submitting it and 
accusations of the latter offence for tactical reasons. 
 
Now, it seems clear that, in light of earlier case law on the issue, the answer 
insofar as idem is concerned should have been that the two acts could in 
principle constitute an idem, but that the determination of that issue in the 
specific case was for the referring court to make. The extent of Mr 
Mantello’s alleged ”participation” could have been limited to the events in 
respect of which judgment had already been passed. On the other hand, it 
might just as easily be true that the involvement included entirely different 
acts which were not materially identical with those underlying the earlier 
judgment. 
 
In reality, the ECJ chose to take a completely different direction. Instead of 
giving its reasoning in principle on the relation in light of the AFSJ 
definition of idem between continuing offences and their constituent parts, 
the court accepts the assessment of the German court that the natural acts 
were not the same. This is all very well and in line with earlier case law. 
However, the ECJ goes on to reinterpret the referred question in an 
unfortunate way. 
 
Claiming that the question ”relates more to the concept of ’finally judged’ 
than that of ’same acts’”, the court reinterprets the issue as having to do with 
finality, i.e. whether the judgment is final in respect of the acts which were 
not prosecuted nor included in the proceedings, solely on the base that the 
investigating authorities were in possession of evidence pertaining to them. 
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The court solves this issue by reference to the stable case law establishing 
that since the judgment is not considered final in respect of those acts on the 
national level, neither can they be considered such on the EU level. 
 
However, please note that there has been a subtle shift here from the issue 
whether there is finality, that is whether a judicial decision constitutes a bar 
to further proceedings on the national level, to the issue of in respect of what 
there is finality. It is the former of these issues to which earlier case law on 
finality pertains, not the latter, which is of course the element of idem. Thus, 
Mantello, through this subtle change in meaning, actually indicates that in 
the future, idem might, through this mechanism, be determined by national 
law. 
6.3 Transnational and Material 
Applicability 
It would seem to be clear from the wording of the two main provisions on 
ne bis in idem in EU law that the application of neither principle is limited 
to purely intranational situations. Rather, the CISA applies only in 
transnational situations, and article 50 CFR applies ”within the union”. 
According to this latter wording, it would also seem that article 50 CFR also 
applies to purely internal situations within the scope of EU law, as 
demonstrated by Åkerberg. 
 
Thus it would seem, in principle, that the traditional pattern of purely 
intranational ne bis in idem application is being replaced on the EU level by 
application based on the scope of EU law. That is, in place of earlier 
limitations of the principle based on national jurisdiction, the legal 
community of the EU is expanding.  
 
However, in practice the picture looks quite different. While in the context 
of the AFSJ the court has consistently applied ne bis in idem transnationally, 
as Toshiba demonstrates, it is still possible to limit the transnational 
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application of ne bis in idem by reference to the idem element. Also, the 
ECJ has not distanced itself from the criteria of identity of the legal interest 
protected, which could form another basis of transnational limitations. 
 
On the material side, Beneo-Orafti, Bonda and lastly Åkerberg together 
show a clear trend towards adoption of the Engel-criteria from the case law 
of the ECtHR in determining the material applicability of ne bis in idem. In 
fact, from Åkerberg it seems that the Engel-criteria are now considered the 
only relevant parameters for determination of ”criminal nature”. This is in 
stark contrast to the earlier two judgments. 
 
In Beneo-Orafti, while the court mentioned 50 CFR, the inapplicability of 
ne bis in idem was motivated by provisions in Regulation 2988/95. This is 
problematic both from a formal and substantive perspective. Formally, it 
seems as if 50 CFR is mentioned simply to give better credibility to the 
arguments of the court, while the actual rules applied are those of the 
regulation. Of course, that regulation is hierarchically inferior to 50 CFR 
and should be informed by the content of that provisions, rather than the 
other way around. Substantially, it should first be noted that the judgment is 
clearly self-contradictory. One measure is not considered a penalty because 
it is a withdrawal of a wrongly obtained advantage, something which 
according to the regulation is not considered a penalty and which is caused 
by ”any irregularity”. The other measure is not considered a penalty because 
the behaviour that justifies it can not be considered an ”irregularity”, which 
is the same as an ”infringement of EU law”. However, the out-of-quota 
production clearly cannot both be and not be an irregularity. In addition, 
while the considerations are similar to the Engel criteria, regarding one 
measure the court focuses entirely on the nature of the penalty, in the other 
entirely on the nature of the offence. 
 
In Bonda, the non-criminal nature of the relevant measures were again 
determined by the provisions of regulation 2988/95. The ne bis in idem 
provision of that regulation was also mentioned, but not 50 CFR. However, 
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the Engel-criteria were mentioned, as a second test of criminal nature, which 
did not ”call into question” the results of the consideration in the light of the 
Union provisions.  
 
In Åkerberg, the situation is entirely different. Here the ”relevant” criteria 
used for determination of criminal nature are the Engel criteria. True, the 
connection between the national provisions and EU law was much weaker 
that for example in Bonda, and perhaps this is the reason why no mention of 
other criteria under EU law were mentioned in Åkerberg. However, the 
trend seems to be to accept the applicability of the Engel-criteria as 
applicable under 50 CFR. 
 
While it should be noted that no mention was made of 50 CFR in Bonda, the 
trend in material applicability would seem to be to subordinate EU 
definitions of the material extent of ne bis in idem to that given by the 
ECtHR. In Åkerberg this is clearly tied to 50 CFR. Also, the court leaves the 
determination of the circumstances of the case to national courts, which are 
of course in their own right bound to respect the case law of the ECtHR. 
 
6.4 The Whole Picture - Conclusions 
In my opinion something that must be considered entirely clear when 
considering earlier and new case law from the ECJ on ne bis in idem is that 
there is no conceptual consistency imposed on that norm by the EU legal 
system as a whole. Mantello either confuses or simply fuses the relatively 
consistent concept of Idem developed in the context of the AFSJ. Toshiba 
seems to apply an entirely different version of idem than that elaborated 
within the AFSJ, which also has the effect of limiting the transnational 
application of the principle. In addition, this function could still be fulfilled 
by the criteria of the ”protected legal interest”. This would seem to go 
against the general trend of replacing traditional intrantional application of 
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ne bis in idem with an application spatially determined by the scope of EU 
law. 
 
So ne bis in idem is not in its application conceptually consistent. That of 
course begs the question why this is so. One possible explanation is that ne 
bis in idem quite simply is not, in itself a specific rule or principle, but rather 
consists in the underlying values it pertains to and a rudimentary conceptual 
organisation around the concept of repetition. In this case, the differing 
applications of the principle could be explained by the argument that it is 
simply not the same rule or principle being applied, but rather a company of 
norms that are somehow inspired by or incorporate a ”core” of ne bis in 
idem. However, this argument would not be very convincing in so far as ne 
bis in idem should be considered a positive norm that makes up part of the 
EU legal system, but rather would have to point to some other sphere where 
the norm exists. This of course brings up the everlasting dichotomy between 
positive and natural law, to which the idea of a ”core” conception of ne bis 
in idem seems to pertain. 
 
Another possible explanation for the very different application of ne bis in 
idem in diferent areas of EU law is that, while they are applications of the 
same norm, the application of that norm is affected by the area of law in 
which it applies. Under such an approach, the less severe application of the 
idem element in the context of competition proceedings could be motivated 
by the fact that the penalties within that area of law are not directed towards 
individuals but towards legal entities, and that therefore the value of the 
rights of the individual are not as relevant. 
 
However, it must be concluded that, taking in consideration all of the 
divergencies above, no one core conception of ne bis in idem in terms of its 
elements or their respective contents is immediately apparent from the case 
law of the ECJ, and it would thus seem that any argumentation towards such 
a ”core” would have to be considered either as being of a de lege ferenda 
nature or limit the definition of the content of that core quite narrowly. 
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